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RELIGION AND POLITICS: A REPLY TO
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA*
Nadine Strossen**
I. Introduction
1 am honored and delighted to speak at the Jewish Theological
Seminary ("JTS"). From a personal perspective, I am especially
pleased to be here because I am Jewish myself and live right in this
neighborhood. On both counts, therefore, I feel quite at home. As
a civil libertarian, I always feel especially comfortable in Jewish
audiences, because Judaism entails such a strong commitment to
human rights.
When Rabbi Visotzky invited me to participate in this lecture
series, he gave me a lot of latitude to deal with its broad subject-
religion and politics-but he suggested I might well want to re-
spond to the remarks that Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
made on this and related subjects when he lectured in this series
last month. Indeed, Rabbi Visotzky noted my self-restraint during
the question-and-answer session that followed Justice Scalia's lec-
ture, which I attended, since I did not raise any questions or com-
ments then. That was only because I respected the free speech
rights of other audience members, and not because I had no com-
ments. To the contrary, I was overflowing with responses to Justice
Scalia's remarks, but I knew that I would get my chance to make
them tonight.
Justice Scalia spent much of his lecture describing and comment-
ing on the thirteen Establishment Clause cases the Supreme Court
* This piece is an edited transcript of Professor Strossen's oral presentation on
"Religion and Politics" at the Jewish Theological Seminary ("JTS") in New York on
June 18, 1996. She was responding to Justice Antonin Scalia's presentation at JTS on
the same subject on May 21, 1996. Excerpts from both presentations were broadcast
on National Public Radio's program "Bridges: A Liberal-Conservative Dialogue," on
August 2, 1996. The edits reflect developments subsequent to the oral presentations,
including the Supreme Court's two decisions in June, 1997 concerning the First
Amendment's religion clauses: City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), and
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
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Pickens, Andrew G. Sfouggatakis, and Laura Haldeman.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV
had decided during his tenure on the Court.' The American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU") had directly represented the parties as-
serting Establishment Clause claims in half of these cases. I disa-
gree with Justice Scalia's assessment of almost all of those cases, as
well as with almost everything else he said.
But before I get to the areas of disagreement, let me start on a
positive note by stressing one thing I really liked and admired
about Justice Scalia's presentation: his sense of humor. I believe
that retaining one's good humor is essential, even when discussing
deeply important subjects such as religion and politics; indeed, it is
especially important in such contexts. This point was made during
a recent discussion in one of the ACLU's on-line chat rooms.'
There was a competition to come up with other phrases for which
our initials could stand. From my perspective, the hands-down
winner was, "Aw, C'mon, Lighten Up!"
In that spirit, I would like to describe a political cartoon about
the ACLU that came out right before Passover this year, which is
germane to the topic of this lecture series. It depicts Moses in front
of Mount Sinai bearing the two tablets. As Moses shows them to a
man who is pulling a wagon carrying a golden calf on which is em-
blazoned "ACLU," the man scratches his chin skeptically and com-
ments: "The Ten Recommendations? I guess I can live with that."
Amusing as it is, this cartoon also raises a serious point that is
central to the theme of this lecture series. It taps into the wide-
spread misconception that a strong vision of the Establishment
Clause3 -which the ACLU has consistently defended-is somehow
inimical or hostile to religion. This misconception was belied, for
example, by the three co-authors of the Handbook on Religious
1. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Rosen-
berger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Board of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Board of
Educ. of Westside Community Schs. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490
U.S. 680 (1989); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Bowen v. Ken-
drick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578
(1987).
2. The ACLU's on-line forums can be accessed through the ACLU's site on
America Online (keyword "ACLU") or on the World Wide Web <http://
www.aclu.org>.
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion...").
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Liberty,4 which the ACLU recently published. These three are an
ordained Baptist minister, an ordained Episcopal priest, and some-
one who had studied at rabbinical school (although he did not be-
come a rabbi). Recognizing that to many their religiosity might
seem inconsistent with their strict separationist beliefs, they wrote:
"[T]he three authors of this book believe, with the American
Civil Liberties Union, that keeping religion and state separate is
not godless but in the best interest of both religion and state." 5
Robust First Amendment religious freedoms, including those
under the Establishment Clause, are especially important to mem-
bers of religious minorities, including Jews. Rabbi Eric Yoffie of
the Union of American Hebrew Congregations recently wrote:
"The provision in the U.S. Constitution of church-state separation,6
more than any other, has assured Jews religious freedom and social
success in this country." 7
Alas, that centrally important guarantee is now very much under
attack. The attacks have been mounted by well-organized radical
right-wing groups such as the Christian Coalition, and they have
been supported by the rulings of Justice Scalia and some of his
Supreme Court colleagues, who share those groups' narrow under-
standing of the Establishment Clause.
I deliberately eschew the label that is commonly applied to those
groups, "the Religious Right," since that implies that it is the reli-
gious nature of their beliefs that is somehow objectionable or anti-
thetical to civil liberties, including religious freedom. Any such
implication would be completely incorrect for two reasons. First,
individuals have fundamental freedoms to hold and assert religious
beliefs, and to seek to influence the government to enact policies
that are consistent with those beliefs. Whenever those rights are
threatened, the ACLU stands up for them. 8 Second, many reli-
gious people and organizations, including those with Christian be-
4. BARRY LYNN ET AL., THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE BASIC ACLU
GUIDE TO RELIGIOUS RIGHTS (1995).
5. ld. at Introduction.
6. While the Establishment Clause is commonly paraphrased as guaranteeing
"separation of church and state," I prefer to substitute "religion" for "church" in that
phrase, in recognition of the fact that a church is the place of worship only for certain
religions.
7. Rabbi Eric H. Yoffie, A Liberal Response, REFORM JUDAISM, Spring 1993, at
9, 11.
8. To cite one recent example, the ACLU opposed a proposed lobbying "reform"
bill that would have curtailed the First Amendment rights of (among others) the
Christian Coalition, by requiring it to turn its membership lists over to the federal
government; the ACLU accordingly collaborated with the Christian Coalition in
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liefs, have supported separation of government and religion,9 and
other human rights,' ° specifically because such rights are consistent
with their religious beliefs. Therefore, it is the anti-civil-liberties
aspects of the agenda of the Christian Coalition and other extreme
right-wing groups to which I object, not any religious beliefs that
may undergird that agenda.
While the Christian Coalition may not represent the majority of
Christians," it has disproportionately great political strength, 2
which it has wielded to the detriment of civil liberties, including
separation of government and religion.' 3 The Christian Coalition's
anti-liberties clout was highlighted by the 1996 Republican Con-
vention. The Coalition's Executive Director, Ralph Reed, boasted
that 60% of the Convention's delegates were supporters of his or-
working to defeat the bill. See 140 Cong. Rec. S14281, at S14283 (1994) (Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1994, S. 349, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.).
9. Church Groups Fight Proposal For Amendment On School Prayer, THE NEWS
TRIB., July 23, 1996, at Al (noting leaders of major religious groups denounced plans
to revive organized school prayer through a constitutional amendment, warning it
would weaken safeguards provided by the separation of church and state); see also
Jim Myers, Ministers Assail Prayer Proposal, TULSA WORLD, July 23, 1996, at Al
(stating ministers from several of the country's major denominations denounced as
"dangerous" and "radical" a renewed effort in Congress to add a school prayer
amendment to the Constitution).
10. Larry Witham, Effort to Topple Veto Unites Leaders of Society in Prayer; They
See Declining Nation, Illegitimate Government in Failure, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996
(noting some religious groups back partial-birth abortion as a woman's choice or a
means to health); see also Ira Rifkin, Some Religious Republicans Lament Harsh
Abortion Stance, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 15, 1996 (stating religious liberals who support
abortion rights have held rallies and news conferences).
11. The End of Church-State Separation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1995, at A15 (noting
the Christian Coalition does not speak for all Christians, nor even a majority of Chris-
tians); see also Payback Time, COURIER-JOURNAL, May 27, 1995, at 14A (stating that
the Christian Coalition does not represent even a majority of Christians).
12. Richard Vara, Religion's Top 10 In 1995: Rabin Death Leads the List, Hous.
CHRON., Dec. 30, 1995 (noting the continuing political strength of the Christian Coali-
tion with an estimated 1.7 million members); see also Curtis Wilkie, Christian Right
Takes Control of Iowa GOP, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 1995 (noting that a Des Moines
School Board candidate had compared the political strength of the Christian Coali-
tion to "a virus that is strong and virulent").
13. The Peril of Prayer in Public Schools, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Sept. 16,
1996 (stating the Christian Coalition is attempting to have school prayer imposed and
it would like to fuse religion and government so that one institution is followed as
blindly and without question as the other); Threat to Our Freedom, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, June 12, 1995, at 29A (noting that the "Christian Coalition is ... seeking to
amend the Constitution and subvert the First Amendment.... The Coalition's Con-
tract with the American family will essentially do away with the separation of church
and state, eroding our rights to freedom of and from religion and jeopardizing our
freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and our right to petition the government").
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ganization. 14 Not surprisingly, then, the Convention toed the Coa-
lition's line on major issues, despite the objections of many
Republican elected officials and party leaders, including the party's
Presidential nominee, Bob Dole. 5 One striking example concerns
separation of government and religion. The Republican platform
calls for a constitutional amendment to fundamentally rewrite the
Establishment Clause by permitting government-sponsored prayer
in the public schools and other public places.' 6
The positions and political influence of the radical right were
well-documented in a book that the Anti-Defamation League
("ADL") published in 1994, entitled The Religious Right: The As-
sault on Tolerance & Pluralism in America.'7 It is a marvelous but
frightening documentation of the current right-wing threat to reli-
gious liberty in general, and to the religious liberty of Jews in
particular.
Just as a strictly-enforced Establishment Clause is especially
helpful to religious minorities, an unenforced or under-enforced
Establishment Clause is especially threatening to them. At best,
lowering Thomas Jefferson's proverbial "wall" between govern-
ment and religion' 8 has the unintended effect of disadvantaging
religious minorities, including Jews.19 At worst, it is expressly in-
14. John Harwood, Campaign '96: Conservative Christians Prove More Powerful
Than Dole in Shaping the GOP Abortion Plank, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1996, at A14
(noting religious conservatives account for nearly 60% of the delegates to the 1996
Republican convention).
15. U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 25, 1996, at 10 (stating that the Religious Right's plank
on abortion was included in the Republican Platform despite the objections of the
party's Presidential nominee; while Dole did not oppose abortion in cases of rape,
incest or endangerment to the mother's life, the platform called for a constitutional
amendment completely prohibiting abortion in all cases).
16. School Prayer-Again House Republicans are Tinkering Needlessly With The
First Amendment, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1996, at N10 (noting a familiar election-year
issue has resurfaced on Capitol Hill, where the Republican majority leader is calling
for the adoption of a constitutional amendment that explicitly authorizes "student-
sponsored prayer" in public school); School Prayer Revisited, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, July 25, 1996 (stating that the school-prayer measure has been given a bit
of fresh momentum for the coming year election).
17. DAVID CANTOR, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT: THE ASSAULT ON TOLERANCE &
PLURALISM IN AMERICA (1994).
18. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting reply from
Thomas Jefferson to an address by a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association
(January 1, 1802)).
19. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment):
[T]he First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those
whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed
with hostility. The history of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates
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tended to do so, reflecting a current of anti-Semitism. That theme
was at least an undercurrent in the following declaration by Pat
Robertson, President of the Christian Coalition:
The Constitution of the United States is a marvelous document
for self-government by Christian people. But the minute you
turn the document into the hands of non-Christian people and
atheist people, they can use it to destroy the very foundation of
our society.20
That statement is particularly shocking, given that Pat Robertson is
not only a minister, but also a lawyer. Having received his legal
education at Yale Law School,21 he should have learned about the
secular nature of our Constitution and the government it created.22
There are connections among the radical right's attacks on civil
liberties, the anti-Semitism that, as the ADL has documented, un-
derlies many of these attacks, 23 and also its constant demonizing of
the ACLU, which it regularly targets as the "anti-Christ" in fun-
draising letters and other communications.24 For example, in a
1990 Los Angeles Times interview, Billy McCormack, a director of
the Christian Coalition, said the following: "The Jewish element in
the ACLU ... is trying to drive Christianity out of the public place
.... Because the ACLU is made up of a tremendous amount of
Jewish attorneys. '25
the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging reli-
gious groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Amish.
20. CANTOR, supra note 17, at 6.
21. Pat Robertson graduated from Yale Law School in 1955.
22. See Isaac Kramnick, Jefferson vs. the Religious Right, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1994, at A15 (noting that Jefferson was a strong adherent of church/state separation
who wrote that "[t]he legitimate powers of government extend to such [religious] acts
only as are injurious to others, but it does no injury for my neighbor to say there are
20 Gods or no God. It neither picks my pockets nor breaks my leg.").
23. CANTOR, supra note 17, at 5 (citing, taped interview with Billy McCormack,
director of the Christian Coalition (Nov. 14, 1990)); id. at 42.
24. Referring back to the on-line chat I described earlier, about other phrases for
which "ACLU" could stand, I have seen some vicious attacks on our organization that
say those initials should stand for "Anti-Christian Liberties Union." See, e.g., Edith
Stanley, American Album: Alabama Judge Goes to Court in Religious Battle, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 1996 (stating that Rev. Mickey Kirkland, pastor of the Lighthouse
Baptist Church in Montgomery shouted out "The American Civil Liberties Union
should change their name to the Anti-Christian Lawyers Union"); Cody Lows,
ACLU, Too, Has Taken to Rabble-Rousing to Raise Funds, ROANOKE TIMES &
WORLD NEWS, Oct. 1, 1995 (noting the "religious right" has taken a hard rap for
being intolerant and extremist; for example, in its fund-raising letters, the American
Civil Liberties Union is renamed the Anti-Christian Liberties Union).
25. CANTOR, supra note 17, at 5 (citing, Taped interview with Billy McCormack,
Director of the Christian Coalition (Nov. 14, 1990)).
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I hasten to underscore that I am certainly not making charges of
anti-Semitism against all people who hold narrow views about the
First Amendment's religion clauses. But I am accusing them of at
least insufficient consciousness of the adverse impact that such nar-
row views have on Jews and other religious minorities. For exam-
ple, during his JTS talk, Justice Scalia referred to some
constitutional rights as a "luxury ' 26 that we cannot afford. In that
context, he was referring specifically to constitutional rights of peo-
ple who are accused or suspected of crime, but he has also shown a
similarly dismissive attitude toward the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause,27 which guarantees freedom of worship. In his
majority opinion in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith,28 which radically truncated the scope of that
clause, Justice Scalia dismissed the important constitutional right at
stake in a manner that was almost cavalier, and he overlooked how
particularly significant that right is to religious minorities.29 In her
separate opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor decried Smith's
abandonment of the Court's traditionally strict enforcement of the
Free Exercise Clause precisely because of the adverse impact on
religious minorities: "The history of our free exercise doctrine am-
ply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had on
unpopular or emerging religious groups such as the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses and the Amish. ' 30
I would now like to turn to three major topics that are implicated
both by the theme of this lecture series and by Justice Scalia's talk:
constitutional interpretation regarding individual liberty in general,
and constitutional interpretation specifically regarding the two reli-
gion clauses of the First Amendment-the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause.
H. Constitutional Interpretation
Justice Scalia proudly described himself as a "textualist" and
said "strict constructionists give textualists a bad name." With all
due respect, though, I think Justice Scalia himself gives textualists a
bad name. He celebrated "textualism" as supposedly being faithful
26. Justice Antonin Scalia, Address at the Jewish Theological Seminary (May 21,
1996).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..
28. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
29. See discussion of this opinion, infra text accompanying notes 165-73.
30. Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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either to the Constitution's plain language or, where the language
is not clear, to history and tradition. He asserted that this was the
most objective, predictable approach to constitutional
interpretation.
However, Justice Scalia's own statements showed that textualism
does not in fact live up to any of these claims. The difficult, contro-
versial issues of constitutional law are not, by definition, squarely
resolved by the Constitution's text. To the contrary, the text itself
demonstrates that the framers intended certain provisions to be
open-ended, and therefore to be interpreted in light of changing
conditions. As the great Chief Justice John Marshall famously de-
clared, in support of an expansive interpretation of a constitutional
provision early in our history: "We must never forget it is a Consti-
tution we are expounding.., intended to endure for ages to come,
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs." 31
During his lecture, Justice Scalia showed a selective, subjective
approach to textualism. For example, he was willing to deviate
from the Fourth Amendment's strict warrant and probable cause
requirements, commenting: "The needs of our society have not
now or ever been able to tolerate such an indulgence." As previ-
ously noted, this is. similar to Justice Scalia's view of the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause as a dispensable "luxury."
Apparently, then, according to Scalian textualism, only some con-
stitutional provisions should be enforced strictly as written.
In this vein, it was ironic that Justice Scalia's lecture warned of
the danger of "morphing" the Constitution on the ground that this
could lead to the erosion of constitutional rights. Justice Scalia
maintained that judicial "morphing" of the Constitution by recog-
nizing rights it does not expressly enumerate inevitably would lead
to judicial "morphing" in the opposite direction: not recognizing
rights it does expressly enumerate. In fact, though, Justice Scalia
and other members of the Court's so-called "conservative" wing
have often, unblushingly, ignored plain constitutional language to
do just that.
For example, Justice Scalia recently authored a majority opinion
that in effect created an exception to the Bill of Rights for public
school students,32 despite the absence of any constitutional lan-
guage suggesting that rights are limited to the "free adults '33 with
31. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819).
32. Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
33. Id. at 2392.
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whom Justice Scalia's opinion contrasted the young people who are
studying in our nation's public schools. Conservative Justices also
have read into the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause excep-
tions to constitutionally protected speech, which are not even sug-
gested in the text, let alone clearly delineated there. That is true,
for example, for the sexually-oriented expression that the Court
has banished beyond the First Amendment pale under the rubric of
"obscenity."'  As another example, conservative Justices have
read an unwritten limitation into the open-ended equality guaran-
tee in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,
deeming it to treat gender-based discrimination and other types of
discrimination as less violative than racial discrimination.
It is completely consistent with the plain language and design of
the Constitution to conclude that it tolerates-indeed, com-
mands-what Justice Scalia would apparently consider "one-way
morphing": i.e., to, authorize judicial enforcement of rights it does
not expressly enumerate, but not to authorize judicial non-enforce-
ment of rights it does expressly enumerate. There is no symmetry
here, for a very important reason that Justice Scalia overlooked:
our fundamental rights are not limited to those set out in the Con-
stitution. Our government was founded on a natural rights philos-
ophy, eloquently articulated in the Declaration of Independence.
Our founders shared the Enlightenment view that human beings
are entitled to certain fundamental rights merely by virtue of being
human, and that no government may legitimately abridge those in-
herent rights. To the contrary, one of the most important functions
of government, in their view, is to protect those rights.36
This philosophy of inherent human rights pervades all of our
government's constitutive documents: not only the Declaration of
Independence, but also the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. For
34. Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre et al. v. Slaton,
418 U.S. 939 (1974).
35. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2295 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (reaffirming that "classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives").
36. Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right. A Jurisprudentially
Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145, 219-20 (1984) (stating
"[the] basic expectation of the founders had been that the rights of man are protected
under the Constitution, and it is a truism that universal rights must necessarily be our
own."); John Hasnas, From Cannibalism to Caesareans: Two Conceptions of Funda-
mental Rights, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 900, 912 (1995) (explaining that our founders shared
classical conception of inherent fundamental rights which protect individuals' choices
from government interference).
1997] 435
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV
example, the Constitution's Preamble recites as one of the pur-
poses of the newly-formed government structure "to secure the
blessings of Liberty. '37 Significantly, it does not refer to "granting"
liberty, but rather to securing the liberty to which individuals were
already entitled, wholly independent of the Constitution or any
other charter of government.
Of course, proponents of the Bill of Rights advocated an explicit
enumeration of certain fundamental rights to be protected from
government infringement.38 Moreover, even opponents of amend-
ing the Constitution to add the Bill of Rights did not disagree with
the natural rights philosophy; to the contrary, they opposed adding
the Bill of Rights precisely because of that philosophy. Consistent
with that philosophy, they believed that an express Bill of Rights
was at best unnecessary and at worst dangerous. It was unneces-
sary because the Constitution did not-and, indeed, could not-
vest the new government with power to violate inherent individual
rights. Worse yet, they considered an express Bill of Rights to be
at least potentially dangerous, because the enumeration of certain
rights could create an implication that no other fundamental rights
were secure against government infringement.39 Specifically to
counter any such "negative pregnant," the Ninth Amendment was
included in the Bill of Rights, stating: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."'' 4
Consistent with the plain language of the Ninth Amendment and
the underlying constitutional history, every Justice on the current
Court and in modern history has agreed that the Constitution im-
plicitly protects some unenumerated rights;41 the Justices simply
37. U.S. CONST. preamble (emphasis added).
38. Stephen Macedo, Originalism and the Inescapability of Politics, 84 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1203, 1208 (1990) (noting that the Anti-Federalists insisted on an explicit
enumeration of rights in the Constitution to "ensure the preservation of popular
liberty").
39. Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90
COLuM. L. REV. 1215, 1226 (1990) (stating that the "[F]ederalists responded that the
inclusion of specific reservations of particular rights, as contemplated by the proposed
bill of rights, was not merely unnecessary, but positively dangerous. A bill of rights
would reverse the Constitution's premise that all not granted was reserved; instead,
the government would hold all power except what was prohibited in the bill of
rights").
40. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX.
41. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, JJ.) (recognizing "the constitutional liberty of the woman to have
some freedom to terminate her pregnancy"); id. at 912 (Stevens, J., concurring/dis-
senting) (finding that "[t]he Constitution would be equally offended by an absolute
436
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disagree among themselves as to which such rights it protects. Jus-
tice Scalia himself has recognized the existence of implied funda-
mental rights,42 even in his JTS lecture. He said that when the
Constitution's text is unclear, the benchmark for protected rights
should be "what American society has traditionally accepted." But
he was also willing to depart selectively from this asserted bench-
mark (just as he was willing to depart selectively from strict
textualism).
The first question that this assertion by Justice Scalia triggered in
my mind was actually asked by someone else in the audience at his
lecture: What about such time-honored American traditions as out-
lawing interracial marriage, mandating segregated schools, and im-
posing sectarian prayers in public schools? Justice Scalia's answer
to that question was disturbing in two respects. First, he answered
only regarding interracial marriage. Therefore, maybe he would
find, for example, that sectarian public school prayers are justified
by tradition; indeed, his answer to another audience question indi-
cated that to be the case, as I will discuss later.
Second, Justice Scalia said that anti-miscegenation laws violated
the text of the Equal Protection Clause. But that is certainly not
requirement that all women undergo abortions as by an absolute prohibition on abor-
tions"); Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989) (Rehnquist, J.) (finding a right of
freedom of association); id. at 28 (Stevens and Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (finding a
right of association); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (not-
ing, in a 7-0 opinion, that the "Constitution guarantees freedom of association ... as
an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties"); Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion) (upholding the constitutional right
to structure family living arrangements); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 463
(White, J. concurring) (finding a right to use contraceptives); Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160 (1941) (holding, without dissent, that the Constitution implicitly protects
a fundamental right to interstate travel); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (reaffirming unanimously Meyer's holding of the right of parents to determine
their children's upbringing); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding, without
dissent, that parents have a fundamental right to raise their own children).
42. Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1218 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, stating that the Supreme Court must act
whenever "rights of association [are] ensnared in statutes which, by their broad
sweep, might result in burdening innocent associations." 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973));
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 550 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (agreeing that a California statute requiring California Rotary Clubs to
admit women did not violate members' rights of association); Bray v. Alexandria Wo-
men's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (holding that the "right-to-interstate travel"
is not impinged by anti-abortion protesters, whose actions limited respondents' intra-
state travel); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (joining the Court's holding that
inmates had a constitutionally protected right to marry).
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obvious from the plain language of the clause itself,4 3 or from its
history. Nor does the plain language" or history of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause clearly outlaw segregated schools. Even the Court's
landmark decision invalidating such schools, Brown v. Board of
Education,45 itself recognized this.46 Indeed, Justice Scalia's usual
ideological ally, Chief Justice Rehnquist, a law clerk to Justice
Jackson while the Court was considering Brown, notoriously urged
Jackson to reject Brown's challenge to racially segregated public
schools on this basis.47
Just as Justice Scalia selectively sanctions the Court's departure
from tradition to uphold rights that are not clearly protected in the
Constitution's text, he also has approved the Court's departure
43. One could plausibly argue that anti-miscegenation laws do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because they apply equally to any affected races; for exam-
ple, whites are no more free to marry blacks than blacks are to marry whites. Indeed,
courts rejecting constitutional challenges to these laws prior to Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967), had accepted this argument. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1888)
(finding no discrimination against any race in the statute because "[w]hatever discrim-
ination is made in the punishment prescribed in the two sections is directed against
the offense designated and not against the person of any particular color or race. The
punishment of each offending person, whether white or black, is the same.").
If Justice Scalia rejects the reasoning of Pace, that should bode well for his analysis
of another type of marriage ban that might eventually trigger Supreme Court review:
the prohibition on same-sex marriages. If the Equal Protection Clause constrains any
ban on marriages between members of two races, even though the ban applies equally
to members of both races, then it should also constrain any ban on marriages between
members of the same gender, even though the ban applies equally to members of
both genders (i.e., both males and females are prohibited from marrying someone of
the same gender). See Erik J. Toulon, Call The Caterer: Hawaii To Host First Same-
Sex Marriage, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 109, 133 (1993). Toulon notes
that in Loving, the Court held that prohibitions on interracial marriage denied equal
protection because such prohibitions discriminated by allowing a white man to marry
a white woman while at the same time preventing a black man from marrying a white
woman. Id. Toulon points out that this is the same analysis employed by the
Supreme Court of Hawaii within the context of a ban on same-sex marriages in Baehr
v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (1993) (i.e., the court found that Hawaii's ban on same-sex
marriages denied equal protection because the state conditions access to marriage on
the basis of sex, allowing a man to marry a woman while at the same time preventing
a woman from marrying a woman). Toulon, supra.
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that "[n]o State shall.., deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. Id. at 489-90.
47. David J. Garrow, The Rehnquist Reins, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at 65 (noting
that a "controversy [arose] when a Rehnquist memorandum arguing against any
Supreme Court voiding of segregated schools and for a continued endorsement of the
old doctrine of separate but equal was discovered in Jackson's fie on Brown v. Board
of Educ. Rehnquist unpersuasively insisted-as he would again during his 1986 con-
firmation hearings for Chief Justice-that the memo represented an articulation of
Jackson's views rather than his own.").
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from tradition to deny constitutional rights-specifically in the con-
text of religious liberty. As I explain more fully below,4 8 Justice
Scalia authored a 1990 decision that not only jettisoned the Court's
modern precedents enforcing the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause; moreover, it did so without any consideration of-and, in-
deed, in defiance of-the historical underpinnings of that Clause.
In short, Justice Scalia does not in fact demand strict adherence
to tradition in answering questions not clearly resolved by the Con-
stitution's text. Accordingly, his vaunted tradition-based approach
to constitutional interpretation lacks the chief advantages that he
ascribes to it: predictability, objectivity, and constraining judicial
discretion.
A tradition-centered constitutional interpretation could not be
justified even if it were consistently invoked and therefore did con-
strain judicial discretion. Contrary to Justice Scalia's deference to
tradition, the Supreme Court has long recognized that "no one ac-
quires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution
by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire national
existence and indeed predates it."'49 Moreover, there is an even
more fundamental problem with the notion of limiting constitu-
tional freedoms to those encompassed by Justice Scalia's formula-
tion, "what American society has traditionally accepted": it is a
complete reversal of the concept of fundamental rights underlying
our governmental system. Our government's founders wisely rec-
ognized the potential "tyranny of the majority,"50 in James
Madison's famous phrase. Therefore, the government they created
was not a pure democracy. To be sure, most public policy decisions
are committed to the democratically elected, majoritarian legisla-
tive and executive branches of government. However, as the Con-
stitution's framers recognized, there are some rights that are so
fundamental that no majority, no matter how large, may deny them
to any minority, no matter how small or unpopular.
This constitutional philosophy was most eloquently stated in the
Supreme Court's landmark 1943 opinion in West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette.5 Significantly, for present purposes, Bar-
nette was a case involving religious liberty-specifically, the reli-
48. See infra part IV.
49. Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
50. Clarence Page, Bork Shows His Grouchy Side, Again, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1996,
at 23 (noting that after the framers of the Constitution put majority rule into place,
they went back and shored up minority rights in the Bill of Rights precisely to guard
against what James Madison called "the tyranny of the majority").
51. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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gious freedom of Jehovah's Witnesses, who believed that saluting
the American flag violated the First Commandment's bar on idola-
try. In striking down mandatory flag salute laws as violating the
rights of the members of this minority faith, the Court ringingly
affirmed not only freedom of belief and conscience; it also set out
core precepts regarding all fundamental rights:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to estab-
lish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of
no elections.5 2
In his JTS lecture, Justice Scalia praised the common law ap-
proach of building on tradition, and said he wanted to emulate it
for constitutional law. But even the arch-apostle of common-law
judging, Oliver Wendell Holmes, himself denounced the type of
rigid adherence to tradition that Justice Scalia espouses. Holmes
declared, "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that it was so laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imita-
tion of the past. 53
Along with Holmes, other respected conservative Justices have
rejected Justice Scalia's rigid view that the Bill of Rights is "a static
document," to quote another phrase Justice Scalia used during his
JTS lecture. One prominent example is Justice John Marshall
Harlan, one of the most respected conservative jurists in modem
history. 4 Yet, despite his deep judicial conservatism, Justice
Harlan was the first exponent of an expansive interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as containing an im-
plicit guarantee of personal privacy and autonomy in matters of
sexuality and reproduction. Accordingly, in a 1961 dissent, Justice
Harlan became the first Supreme Court Justice willing to strike
down as unconstitutional a state law restricting contraception.
52. Id. at 638.
53. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1896-97).
54. See generally Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice John Marshall Harlan,
36 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
55. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Not until four years later did a majority of Justices reach that con-
clusion in the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut.56 The
unenumerated right of reproductive autonomy, which the con-
servative Justice Harlan first articulated, was of course the founda-
tion for the Court's historic ruling invalidating restrictions on
abortion in Roe v. Wade,57 a decision that Justice Scalia has
strongly criticized and sought to overrule.58
In contrast with Justice Scalia's "static" concept of personal lib-
erty, Justice Harlan enforced an evolving concept. He wrote:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula ....
[T]hrough the course of this Court's decisions [due process] has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon ... re-
spect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society.... The balance
... is... struck by... having regard to... the traditions from
which [this country] developed as well as the traditions from
which it broke. That tradition is a living thing... [T]he full scope
of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause ... is a
rational continuum which ... includes a freedom from all sub-
stantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints .... 59
As this passage makes clear, Justice Scalia's rigid, narrow notion
of the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation is very dif-
ferent from the more flexible, evolving notion of tradition that has
been enforced by other, leading conservative Justices.
I would now like to turn from interpretation of the Constitution
in general to interpretation of the two specific constitutional provi-
sions regarding religious liberty. Commonly called the "Establish-
ment Clause" and the "Free Exercise Clause," these two provisions
appear in the First Amendment and read as follows: "Congress
56. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
57. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). In Casey, Scalia asserted that the "[s]tates may, if they wish, permit abor-
tion-on-demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so." Id. Scalia
went on to end his dissent by stating that "[w]e should get out of this area [abortion],
where we have no right to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor the country any
good by remaining." Id. Scalia noted that his "views on this matter [were] unchanged
from those [he] set forth in [his] separate opinions" in both Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
59. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. '60
Il. Establishment Clause
A. The Myth That the Courts Have Driven Religion from the
Public Square
As I explained earlier, the Establishment Clause is now facing a
very strong attack from the extreme right wing. The Christian Co-
alition and its many Congressional allies have declared it an impor-
tant goal to enact a constitutional amendment that would carve out
an exception to the Establishment Clause to permit government-
sponsored prayer in public schools and other public places. 61 Pro-
ponents of such an amendment, which is endorsed by the Republi-
can Party Platform, have misleadingly labeled it the "religious
equality" amendment or the "religious liberty" amendment.62
Those inaccurate labels reflect one of the many myths and mis-
conceptions that abound in the ongoing Establishment Clause de-
bate: that students may not now pray in public schools, or-worse
yet-that religion has been purged from the public schools alto-
gether by the Establishment Clause and the Supreme Court's deci-
sions enforcing it.63 When I recently debated Pat Robertson about
the appropriate role of religion in public schools, he repeated this
Big Lie over and over.64 For example, he decried "the judicial dis-
60. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
61. Cody Lowe, Goodlatte For Statute On Prayer Amendment Moving Slowly, Ro-
ANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, July 29, 1996, at Cl (stating that the Christian Coali-
tion and some other conservative Christian organizations continue to support a
constitutional amendment related to prayer in public schools); John M. Swomley,
Watch on the Right: Pat Robertson's Contract on America, THE HUMANIST, July 1,
1995, at 35 (noting that one Christian Coalition agenda point is called "a religious
equality amendment" which if adopted, would change the United States from a secu-
lar to a religious nation, nullifying the First Amendment's Establishment Clause).
62. Amendments Threaten Right to Religious Freedom, THE BUFFALO NEWS, July
14, 1996, at 1OF (stating that "two constitutional amendments have been introduced in
the 104th Congress that would virtually repeal the Establishment Clause" and that
"[t]hese initiatives have been dubbed by their sponsors as the Religious Liberty
Amendment and the Religious Equality Amendment."); R. Upton Nelson, Freedom
from Religion, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Aug. 3, 1995 (LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
file) (stating that "[a] 'Religious Equality Amendment' is being drafted to be intro-
duced in the U.S. Congress. Under the guise of protecting religious speech, this pro-
posed amendment would essentially gut the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.").
63. See, e.g., M.G. "Pat" Robertson, Religion in the Classroom, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 595, 598 (1995).
64. Nadine Strossen, How Much God in the Schools? A Discussion of Religion's
Role in the Classroom, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 607 (1995).
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tortions which have forbidden little children to pray or read the
Bible in school. '6 5 He also charged that the Court and civil liber-
tarians have "misuse[d] the Constitution to exclude religion from
the schools and the public square."66 Correspondingly, he declared
that prayer should be "returned" to the public schools. 67
Ironically, Mr. Robertson gave a list of situations in which stu-
dents' religious freedom was violated, he said, because of the
schools' distorted view of the Supreme Court's rulings.68 He con-
tended that the schools have an exaggerated sense of what the
Court has said the Establishment Clause requires, and hence they
prohibit the kind of individual, voluntary, non-school-endorsed
religious expression that is both protected by the Free Speech
Clause and not prohibited by the Establishment Clause.69 Assert-
ing that "these examples have become the norm ,' 70 he accused the
schools of engaging in a "religious cleansing that they believe has
been mandated by the courts."' 71 But any such distorted view is
fueled by the very kind of mischaracterization in which Mr. Rob-
ertson himself engaged. If schools do in fact believe that the courts
have mandated "religious cleansing," this may well be because
critics such as Mr. Robertson himself have told them so.
These assertions, though, are completely false. Consistent with
the Establishment Clause's guiding principle of government neu-
trality toward religion,72 the Supreme Court recognizes that indi-
vidual students, as well as voluntarily constituted student groups,73
are free to pray in school, subject only to the same constraints that
apply to all student expression.74 In short, they must not disrupt
the education of other students.75 For example, while students may
65. Robertson, supra note 63, at 602.
66. Id. at 598.
67. Id. at 606.
68. Id. at 603.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Robertson, supra note 63, at 604.
72. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
73. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
74. Id. at 247-53.
75. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507-14
(1969) (holding that students' wearing of arm bands in protest of the Vietnam War
was not disruptive and was within the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments); see also id. at 511 (stating that "the prohibition of expression of one particu-
lar opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and
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not pray at the top of their lungs in the middle of class, they may
pray silently.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressly upheld students'
rights to form religious clubs that meet in the public schools to en-
gage in group prayer, Bible study, and other religious activities, so
long as the school permits other student groups to meet on a non-
discriminatory basis.76 Furthermore, far from religion having been
purged from the classroom, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that it is completely constitutional and appropriate for schools to
teach about religion, and its important role in such fields as history,
art, and music, so long as it is discussed in a non-indoctrinating
manner. 77 In short, schools may teach about religion; they simply
may not preach religion. In the Supreme Court's felicitous phrase,
"religious beliefs and ... expression are too precious to be either
proscribed or prescribed by the State. '78
The only type of prayer that the Court has banned from the pub-
lic schools is school-sponsored prayer.79 In the graduation context,
for example, students, parents, and/or religious leaders remain free
to organize their own baccalaureate services, which may include
organized group prayers, but they may not include prayers in the
public schools' own ceremonies.
substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally
permissible").
76. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 246.
77. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 578; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38; Stone, 449 U.S. at 42
(holding that the posting of the Ten Commandments served absolutely no educational
function, such as where they "are integrated into the school curriculum, where the
Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization,
ethics, comparative religion, or the like"); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 97; Schempp, 374
U.S. at 225 (noting that "it might well be said that one's education is not complete
without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship
to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of
study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that
such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular
program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.");
Engel, 370 U.S. at 421; see also Strossen, supra note 64, at 618:
[Schools] may not disfavor religion ... for example, by discriminatorily omit-
ting its role in such fields as. .. to cite something very dear to my own heart,
civil rights. Religion has played a critical role in historic human rights strug-
gles throughout our history, including the abolition of slavery and racial
apartheid. Eliminating discussion of and information about the critically im-
portant role of religion in our society is therefore not neutral, and hence
violates the Establishment Clause.
78. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992).
79. See id. passim; Engel, 370 U.S. at 429-30; accord Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253
(holding that student prayer that was not school-sponsored did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause).
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B. The Myth That Maintaining a Strict Separation Between
Government and Religion Reflects Hostility Toward
Religion
The widespread misconceptions about what the Establishment
Clause requires and how the Supreme Court has enforced that
clause lead to another dangerous distortion in the debates on this
issue: the mistaken view that support for a strict separation be-
tween government and religion evinces hostility toward religion.8°
To the contrary, maintaining government neutrality toward religion
is at least as important for preserving a sacred, holy concept of reli-
gion as it is for preserving a secular state. Therefore, some of the
staunchest separationists, from our founders81 on, have been some
of our most religious citizens. Likewise, some of the most relig-
iously devout Supreme Court Justices have been among the
Court's staunchest guardians of a strict separation between religion
and government. 82
In a 1989 decision in which the Court upheld an Establishment
Clause challenge to a prominent religious display in a government
building,83 Justice Blackmun (who has publicly acknowledged his
Christian faith) 84 forcefully objected to the dissent's view that this
ruling somehow evinced hostility toward religion.85 Responding to
this argument in the dissent, which Justice Kennedy authored and
in which Justice Scalia joined, Justice Blackmun wrote:
Although Justice Kennedy repeatedly accuses the Court of har-
boring a "latent hostility" or "callous indifference" toward reli-
gion, nothing could be further from the truth, and the
80. See generally Robertson, supra note 63. For a recent example, see Mary Ann
Glendon, Religious Freedom and Common Sense, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1997 at All
(describing Supreme Court opinions enforcing the Establishment Clause as reflecting
an "ill-disguised hostility towards religion").
81. See MARK D. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 6 (1965) (noting
Roger Williams's view that "worldly corruptions... might consume the churches if
sturdy fences against the wilderness were not maintained").
82. See Nina Totenberg, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L.
REV. 33, 37 (1990) ("Justice Brennan is a religious man, a devout Catholic who at-
tends mass every week. Yet .... he is the author of opinions erecting a high wall of
separation between church and state, including decisions banning parochial school aid
.. .11).
83. Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
84. See, e.g., Aaron Epstein, Blackmun Remembered as Abortion Rights Cham-
pion, THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, April 10, 1994, at A18 (noting that Jus-
tice Blackmun is a devout Methodist).
85. Id. at 655 ("[Blackmun's] view of the Establishment Clause reflects an unjusti-
fied hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with our history and our prece-
dents, and I dissent from this holding.") (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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accusations are as offensive as they are absurd. Justice Kennedy
apparently has misperceived a respect for religious pluralism, a
respect commanded by the Constitution, as hostility or indiffer-
ence to religion. No misperception could be more antithetical to
the values embodied in the Establishment Clause.86
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated: "A union of gov-
ernment and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade
religion. '87 It destroys government because it leads to division
along religious lines-the sort of conflicts that have historically led
to brutal wars and are still tearing apart many countries, including
the former Balkans.' And a union between government and reli-
gion degrades religion by watering it down or homogenizing it as a
precondition for government approval.89 In the words of the First
Amendment's author, James Madison: "Religion flourishes in
greater purity, without than with the aid of Gov[emmen]t. 90
We in the United States have one of the most religiously vibrant
communities in the world. 91 Those who have studied religion in
America have consistently concluded that religion is so strong here
precisely because of our Establishment Clause. For example, back
in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that religion was the
strongest of all American institutions, and wrote that "all thought
that the main reason for the quiet sway of religion over their coun-
try was the complete separation of church and state. '92 To this day,
86. Id. at 610.
87. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 606 n.8 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at 431).
88. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 429 (stating that "[the constitutional framers] knew the
anguish, hardship and bitter strife that could come when zealous religious groups
struggled with one another to obtain the Government's stamp of approval. . .
89. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 589-90.
The design of the Constitution is that preservation and transmission of reli-
gious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the
private sphere, which itself is promised freedom to pursue that mission. It
must not be forgotten then, that while concern must be given to define the
protection granted to an objector or a dissenting nonbeliever, these same
Clauses exist to protect religion from government interference.
Id.
90. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1819-1836, at 98, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). Ac-
cord, JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS As-
SESSMENTs (1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 1784-1786, at 295,
301 (Rutland, et al. eds., 1973).
91. Barbara Bedzek, Religious Outlaws: Narrative of Legality and the Politics of
Citizen Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899, 958 n.240 (1995).
92. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 295 (J.P. Mayer ed. &
George Lawrence trans., 1969), quoted in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 822
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the United States has one of the highest percentages of regular at-
tendance at religious services in the world-even higher than that
of countries with official established religions.93
Just as religion flourishes when it is separate from government,
the opposite is also true. Religion is threatened by government
involvement, including government involvement that is ostensibly
in the form of "support."'94 Even government measures that seem
to support religion in the short run-for example, the parochial
school aid program that a bare majority of the Supreme Court up-
held95 in June 1997 (overturning the Court's 1985 decision that had
struck down this same program 96)-in the long run endanger reli-
gion's independence and vitality. This was eloquently explained by
Justice David Souter, dissenting from the Court's 1997 ruling up-
holding parochiaid:
The rule [against government subsidization of religion] ex-
presses the hard lesson learned over and over again in the
American past and in the experiences of the countries from
which we have come, that religions supported by governments
are compromised just as surely as the religious -freedom of dis-
senters is burdened when the government supports religion....
The ban against state endorsement of religion addresses the
same historical lessons.... The human tendency, of course, is to
forget the hard lessons, and to overlook the history of govern-
mental partnership with religion when a cause is worthy, and
bureaucrats have programs. That tendency to forget is the rea-
son for having the Establishment Clause (along with the Consti-
93. GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE'S RELIGION: AMERICAN
FAITH IN THE 90's 48 (1989).
94. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 608-09 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In Weisman, Jus-
tice Blackmun noted:
When the government favors a particular religion or sect, the disadvantage
to all others is obvious, but even the favored religion may fear being
"taint[ed] ... with a corrosive secularism." The favored religion may be
compromised as political figures reshape the religion's beliefs for their own
purposes; it may be reformed as government largesse brings government
regulation. Keeping religion in the hands of private groups minimizes state
intrusion on religious choice and best enables each religion to "flourish ac-
cording to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma."
Id.
95. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (June 23, 1997) (overturning a 1985 decision
and holding that Establishment Clause was not violated by a government program
under which public school teachers are sent into parochial schools to teach remedial
classes there).
96. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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tution's other structural and libertarian guarantees), in the hope
of stopping the corrosion before it starts.97
The "corrosive" effect upon religion of breaches in the wall sepa-
rating it from government are illustrated by the latest school prayer
case decided by the Supreme Court, Lee v. Weisman.98 The Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union represented Daniel and Deborah Weis-
man, a father and daughter, who successfully argued that the First
Amendment barred prayers at public school graduation ceremo-
nies.99 As is typically the case with any organized school prayers,
the school in that case had certain guidelines that it issued to the
members of the clergy who delivered the prayers, which were
designed to make such prayers nonsectarian. 100 But, as the Court
noted, this kind of government involvement with religion should be
at least as troubling to believers as it is to nonbelievers.10 '
For devout believers, it is abhorrent for a government official to
tell them and their religious leader what to include and what not to
include in a prayer. A Baptist minister, with whom I have collabo-
rated in defending both the Free Exercise and Non-Establishment
Clauses of the First Amendment, has noted that, from a religious
person's perspective, a so-called "nonsectarian prayer" is an oxy-
moron. 10 2 If a statement is nonsectarian, he observes, it cannot be
a prayer, but conversely, if it is a genuine prayer, it cannot be non-
sectarian. 03 Consider the case of one student in Texas, the son of a
Baptist minister, whose school officials recently told him that his
"nonsectarian, nonproselytizing" prayer could not include the
words "Jesus" or "God."'" Complaining that he did not know
how to pray without saying "Jesus," he sued the school for mental
anguish caused by violating his religious freedom. 0 5
So, the price that must be paid to utter a school-sponsored
prayer is precisely to strip it of its essential religious character, an
affront to many devout people. 0 6 No wonder, then, that more reli-
97. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2020-21 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
98. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
99. ld. at 599.
100. Id. at 581.
101. Id. at 588-89.
102. Oliver S. Thomas, Remarks at the Law & Philanthropy Conference, New York
University Law School (Oct. 15, 1993).
103. Id.
104. Pamela Coyle, The Prayer Pendulum, 81 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 62, 65.
105. Id.
106. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 727 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun, dissenting from the majority's rejection of an Establishment Clause
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gious institutions signed amicus briefs in support of the ACLU's
position in the Weisman case-opposing the school-organized
graduation prayer-than on the other side. °7 Indeed, this inevita-
ble problem has led even some members of the so-called "Reli-
gious Right" to criticize the ploy that is now being advocated by
other members of the Religious Right: "student-initiated, nonp-
roselytizing, nonsectarian" prayer at graduation ceremonies, pursu-
ant to school-organized elections and school-administered
guidelines.' 8 For example, Kelly Shackelford, who is the South-
west Regional Director of the Rutherford Institute, has com-
mented, "The whole point [of the Establishment Clause] is to keep
government hands out of these things."'109
By the same token, for those who are non-religious, or who fol-
low different religious traditions from those asserted in the school-
sponsored prayer, the exercise is equally problematical, as Justice
O'Connor has well explained:
challenge to a city-sponsored nativity scene, stressed that, under the majority's ration-
ale, "[t]he creche has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday
season, useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning." Id.
107. Briefs supporting the ACLU's clients, the Weismans, were filed by the Baptist
Joint Committee on Public Affairs, the National Council of Churches of Christ in the
U.S.A., the General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, and James E. Andrews
as Stated Clerk of the Federal Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), as well
as several Jewish organizations, including the American Jewish Congress, the Ameri-
can Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, and the National
Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council. See Brief Amici Curiae of the Amer-
ican Jewish Congress, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, American Jewish
Committee, National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith, General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, People for
the American Way, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, New
York Committee on Public Education and Religious Liberty, and James E. Andrews
as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) in Sup-
port of Respondents, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 90-1014). The specifi-
cally religious institutions that filed in support of the school district were the Southern
Baptist Convention and the National Association of Evangelicals. See Brief of the
Southern Baptist Convention Christian Life Commission as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Petitioners, Weisman (No. 90-1014); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Christian Legal
Society, National Association of Evangelicals, and the Fellowship of Legislative
Chaplains, Inc. in Support of Petitioners, Weisman (No. 90-1014).
108. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated and
remanded with directions to dismiss as moot, 115 S. Ct. 2604 (1995); Jones v. Clear
Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993);
ACLU v. Blackhorse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., No. 93-5368 (3d Cir. 1993); Fried-
mann v. Sheldon Community Sch. Dist., No. C93-4052 (N.D. Iowa 1993), vacated on
standing grounds, 995 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1993); Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd.,
844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993).
109. Coyle, supra note 104, at 65.
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The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's stand-
ing in the political community. Government can run afoul of
that prohibition in two principal ways. One is excessive entan-
glement with religious institutions, which may interfere with the
independence of the institutions, give the institutions access to
government or governmental powers not fully shared by
nonadherents of the religion, and foster the creation of political
constituencies defined along religious lines. E.g., Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). The second and more
direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval
of religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insid-
ers, favored members of the political community. Disapproval
sends the opposite message. 110
This adverse impact of government-endorsed religion is not just a
matter of abstract constitutional theory. Its tangible damage is
demonstrated by Deborah Weisman's experience. The most com-
mon question that she got about her case-and the one that the
ACLU most often hears whenever we seek to enforce the Estab-
lishment Clause-is: "Why make such a big deal out of a small
prayer?" Here is Deborah's answer to that question, speaking
from her own experience as a public school student:
I don't think a little prayer is a small thing. It excludes. They
forced me to pray to someone else's God. That is a big deal....
When I am forced to participate in a ritual.., it's an attempt to
make me different from what I am-to change my identity, to
make me conform."'
The desanctification of religion that results from the erosion of
the wall separating it from government was deplored by Justice
Harry Blackmun in a 1984 opinion. He was dissenting from the
majority's rejection of an Establishment Clause challenge to a na-
tivity scene that was sponsored by the City of Pawtucket, Rhode
Island, in Lynch v. Donnelly."12
As an aside, harking back to my initial comments about how im-
portant it is to maintain one's sense of humor about these issues, I
would like to quote a humorous barb that the Mayor of Pawtucket
aimed at the ACLU, which brought the constitutional challenge to
110. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. William H. Freivogel, They Forced Me to Pray To Someone Else's God, ST.
Louis PosT. DISPATCH, Oct. 29, 1991, at lB.
112. 465 U.S. at 726-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
450
RELIGION AND POLITICS
his city's creche. He quipped that the ACLU was opposing this
government-mounted nativity scene due to jealousy, since "in the
whole organization there aren't three wise men or a virgin!"' 113
In a far more serious vein, that same Mayor explained that his
government supported the creche display for the quintessentially
religious purpose of "putting Christ back in Christmas.""' 4 Far
from honoring that religious impulse, though, the Supreme Court's
majority did exactly the opposite. In order to bolster their conclu-
sion that this government-sponsored display was consistent with
the Establishment Clause, the majority de-emphasized both the
religious aspect of the creche display and the religious nature of
Christmas, treating it as part of a broader "winter-holiday sea-
son" 15 and emphasizing its secular and commercial aspects." 6
From Justice Blackmun's perspective, this approach was demean-
ing to his Christian beliefs, as he explained:
While certain persons, including the Mayor of Pawtucket, un-
dertook a crusade to "keep Christ in Christmas," the Court to-
day has declared that presence virtually irrelevant .... The
creche has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of
the holiday season, useful for commercial purposes, but devoid
of any inherent meaning and incapable of enhancing the reli-
gious tenor of the display.... The city has its victory-but it is a
Pyrrhic one indeed. . .. I cannot join the Court in denying
either the force of our precedents or the sacred message that is
at the core of the creche. 1 7
Ironically, though, five years later, it was Justice Blackmun who
held that-at least when displayed next to a municipally sponsored
Christmas tree outside a government building-the menorah was a
primarily secular symbol." 8 He wrote that the combined display of
the tree and the menorah "simply recognizes that both Christmas
and Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season, which
has attained a secular status in our society." 1 9 Justice O'Connor
responded:
113. Laura M. Litvan, Vienna Protests Ban of Religious Songs, WASHINGTON
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1992, at Al.
114. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1161 (1981) (noting that "[tihe Mayor's
insistence on preserving the creche was lauded by many as a determination to 'keep
Christ in Christmas' and, more broadly, to keep God in American life").
115. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 (the generic phrase "winter-holiday season" later ap-
peared in Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 575 (1989)).
116. Id.
117. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 726-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
118. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 613-615.
119. Id. at 575.
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Chanukah is a religious holiday with strong historical compo-
nents particularly important to the Jewish people. Moreover,
the menorah is the central religious symbol and ritual object of
that religious holiday. Under Justice Blackmun's view, however,
the menorah "has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbin-
ger of the holiday season," almost devoid of any religious
significance.' 20
Justice Brennan agreed with her when he wrote:
Indeed, at the very outset of his discussion of the menorah dis-
play, Justice Blackmun recognizes that the menorah is a reli-
gious symbol .... That should have been the end of the case.
But, as did the Court in Lynch, Justice Blackmun, "by focusing
on the holiday 'context' in which the [menorah] appeared, seeks
to explain away the clear religious import of the [menorah]
...." By the end of the opinion, the menorah has become but a
coequal symbol, with the Christmas tree, of "the winter-holiday
season." . . . Pittsburgh's secularization of an inherently reli-
gious symbol, aided and abetted here by Justice Blackmun's
opinion, recalls the effort in Lynch to render the creche a secular
symbol. As I said then: "To suggest, as the Court does, that such
a symbol is merely 'traditional' and therefore no different from
Santa's house or reindeer is not only offensive to those for
whom the creche has profound significance, but insulting to
those who insist for religious or personal reasons that the story
of Christ is in no sense a part of 'history' nor an unavoidable
element of our national 'heritage."' . . . As Justice O'Connor
rightly observes, Justice Blackmun "obscures the religious na-
ture of the menorah and the holiday of Chanukah ... ."12
As the preceding discussion has made clear, far from being hos-
tile to religion, a strong defense of the Establishment Clause to the
contrary is supportive of religion. Conversely, as I have already
explained, 22 those who have only a weak, limited view of the Es-
tablishment Clause are insensitive to the religious beliefs and prac-
tices of members of minority faiths.
C. The Myth That Christians in the U.S. Today Suffer
Systematic Discrimination
The current drive to limit the Establishment Clause and to per-
mit some government-sponsored religious exercises is driven by yet
another pervasive myth: that Christians in the United States today
120. Id. at 633.
121. Id. at 643-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 108-110.
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suffer systematic discrimination. This was a rallying cry in Pat
Buchanan's campaign for the Republican Presidential nomina-
tion.123 It was also a theme echoed in a widely-publicized talk that
Justice Scalia gave at a prayer breakfast at a Baptist law school in
Mississippi this spring. 24 Again, though, the exaggerated claims
do not match the reality. In the United States, Christians in gen-
eral, and evangelical Christians in particular, hardly face the sys-
tematic persecution that members of other religious denominations
have suffered at various periods in U.S. history and in particular
parts of the country. 125
There are undeniably instances in which particular Christian
ministers, worshipers, and congregations have suffered attacks on
their religious freedom. In such instances, the ACLU has defended
the rights of victims of such violations, as we have defended the
123. See Patrick J. Buchanan, Bellicose Barrage of Christian-Bashing, WASH.
TIMES, June 15, 1995 (asking "'Are you now or have you ever been a Christian?' The
way things are going, congressional committees are likely to be asking that question in
a few years."); Amy Bayer, Fighting Words Cost Buchanan While Critics Assail His
In-Your-Face Rhetoric, He Remains Unapologetic, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 12,
1996, at B12 (quoting Buchanan: "We live in an age where the ridicule of blacks is
forbidden, where anti-Semitism is punishable by political death, but where Christian-
bashing is a popular indoor sport."); cf. Stephen Bates, The Christ Coalition Nobody
Knows, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Sept. 25, 1995, at 36 (discussing a comment by
Ralph Reed that the Christian Right seeks a constitutional amendment guaranteeing
freedom of religious speech in schools to keep schoolchildren from being discrimi-
nated against for expressing religious beliefs in public places).
124. Suzanne Fields, Public Discussions Must Find a Place for Religious Faith, THE
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 19, 1996, at 5J (noting that "Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia, a Catholic, speaking to a prayer breakfast at the Mississippi College
School of Law, a private Baptist institution, received a standing ovation when he said,
'We must pray for the courage to endure the scorn of the sophisticated world"').
125. In contrast, Christians do constitute a persecuted religious minority in other
countries. See In the Lion's Den, Puebla Program on Religious Freedom at Freedom
House (profiling eight countries where the persecution of Christians has been most
treacherous in recent years. The study details the abuse, incarceration and killing of
Christians in China, Egypt, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and
Vietnam); Tom Carter, Christians Face Eternal Struggle; Persecution Worsens as West
Watches, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1996, at A16 (noting that both Houses of Congress,
in recognition of the world-wide onslaught, have approved resolutions supporting na-
tional day called "Persecution Sunday"). A.M. Rosenthal has written a series of col-
umns that highlight the plight of Christians worldwide. See, e.g., A.M. Rosenthal, On
My Mind: Questions From West 47th Street, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1997, at A27 (noting
"persecution of Christians must be written about with consistency because it is taking
place with consistency-more, not less."); A.M. Rosenthal, On My Mind& Facing the
Deniers, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1997, at A23 (noting that "China prohibits Christians
from worshiping in any churches except those 'patriotic' ones that submit to the Com-
munist Party's religious-domination apparatus-registration, regulation, control of
clerical appointments and censorship reaching into altar and pulpit, like forbidding
preaching the Second Coming.").
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rights of individuals and organizations of other religions (or of no
religion) when they have been subject to similar attacks.126 But
there is no broad pattern in the U.S. of Christians suffering dis-
crimination or hostility. To the contrary, Christians are in the as-
cendancy, both throughout our political system in general and in
many school systems in particular. 127 Far from being the objects of
ridicule, they are celebrated and courted by every major political
figure.' 28 President Clinton, Bob Dole, and other political officials
and candidates routinely invoke God's blessing in public
speeches. 29 As columnist Katha Pollitt recently noted in The Na-
tion, it would be the kiss of death for a candidate, in contrast, to
express an anti-Christian or anti-religious view.' 30
The actual victims of persecution, discrimination, hostility, and
ridicule-and worse-are not those who practice religion and seek
government support for religion, but rather, those who dare to
stand up for Establishment Clause values and to oppose govern-
ment-sponsored religion. Many ACLU clients in Establishment
Clause cases have suffered physical attacks on themselves, their
families, their pets, their homes, and their property, as the price for
defending religious liberty.
The ACLU often receives complaints from parents, students,
and other members of the community about incidents involving
government-sponsored indoctrination and inculcation of religion,
including in the public schools, as well as persecutions, attacks, and
criticisms because they are members of a minority religion. Often
these victims of religious liberty violations do not want to pursue
their legal remedies, even when we assure them they would win,
because of the hostility, eiimity, persecution, and attacks they
126. The ACLU has supported the religious freedom of, for example, Amish,
Catholics, Hmong, Jehovah's Witnesses, Jews, Presbyterians. See generally SAM
WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990).
127. See John Nichols, American Politics Needs a Religious Left, CAPITAL TIMES,
Sept. 19, 1996, at 12A (noting that "[t]he growth in political influence experienced by
the Christian Coalition is testimony to the fact that Reed is a savvy political
strategist.").
128. See James Robinson, Candidates Paying Less Attention to the Religious Right,
AGENCY FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 18, 1996 (stating, despite the article's title, that "Dole,
and to a lesser extent Clinton, are trying... to court conservative Christians while
hoping not to turn off middle-of-the-road centrist supporters.").
129. See Richard Scheinin, A Rise in Presidential Piety, THE TAMPA TRIBUNE, Oct.
5, 1996, at 4 (stating that "Clinton emphasizes his Southern Baptist roots and Dole his
traditional Christian beliefs."). See also Bates, supra note 123, at 36 (noting that
"President Clinton has repeatedly tried to reach out to conservative Christians.").
130. See Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1996, at 10 (discussing Ms.
Pollitt's view that American politics is "drenched in religion.").
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would face. I fully sympathize with their reluctance to make them-
selves into pariahs or even martyrs.
Too many ACLU clients who have asserted their First Amend-
ment right to be free from government-sponsored religion have
suffered tangibly, as well as psychologically, for doing so. Many
have suffered physical assaults upon themselves and their property.
One brave woman, Joann Bell, had her home burned to the ground
because she dared to stand up for separation of church and state in
a case involving the public elementary and junior high schools that
her daughter and two sons attended in Little Axe, Oklahoma.13 '
The U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Joann, her
co-plaintiff Lucille McCord (who had two children in the Little
Axe schools), and the ACLU that the school violated the Estab-
lishment Clause by sponsoring organized student prayer meetings
at the beginning of the school day.132
Like many of our clients who protest government-endorsed reli-
gious exercises, Joann and Lucille are religious people. 33 Precisely
for that reason, they do not want the government, in the public
schools or anywhere else, promoting any religious exercise, a mat-
ter that they believe belongs within the sphere of their own
churches (or other religious institutions), families, and individual
131. At the time she approached the ACLU to represent her in challenging the
school's violation of her family's religious liberty, Joann Bell had no previous contact
with the ACLU. Indeed, she came from a conservative religious and political back-
ground, in which the ACLU was at best unknown and at worst deionized. Since 1990,
though, Joann has been the Executive Director of the ACLU's Oklahoma affiliate.
The silver lining to the cloud of Joann's heroic but harrowing struggle to defend the
religious liberty of herself and her family is not only that she helped to secure reli-
gious liberty for everyone within the Tenth Judicial Circuit, but also that it led her to
devote her energy and talent to defending the civil liberties of other individuals and
families. As one journalist described Joann Bell and Lucille McCord, they are "'ordi-
nary people' in the extraordinary sense of the word. . . ." Rocky Scott, Prayer Ruling
Unlikely to Resolve Hard Feelings, UPI, Dec. 11, 1982, BC cycle, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File. Also greatly deserving of commendation is the lawyer
who, on behalf of the ACLU, represented Joann Bell and Lucille McCord on a pro
bono basis: Norman, Oklahoma civil rights attorney Micheal Salem.
132. Bell v. Little Axe Independent Sch. Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985).
Teachers often attended, monitored, and participated in these sessions, which were
advertised on classroom bulletin boards and devoted to "prayers, songs, and 'testi-
mony' of students and other individuals concerning the benefits of knowing Jesus
Christ." Id. at 1396-97.
133. See Scott, supra note 131:
Joann Bell was brought up in the Nazarene Church. Prayer sessions, 'giving
testimony'-the practice of standing before others and speaking of religious
experiences-and a strict moral code were a way of life. Lucille McCord has
been a member of the Church of Christ for more than 40 years. . . . 'We try
to live the Bible,' she said.
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consciences. 134 As Lucille declared, "Leave the religion to me.' '1 35
Joann, Lucille, and their children are Protestants; from the per-
spective of the Little Axe School District, though, they were just
not "the right kind" of Protestant, the kind that had supported the
school-sponsored religious activities.
Joann, Lucille, and their children were verbally and physically
assaulted for successfully championing religious liberty. 36 At trial,
Joann and Lucille testified that their children were harassed and
insulted by teachers and students for not attending the daily
school-organized prayer meetings. 37 After the suit was filed, up-
side-down crosses were taped to the children's school lockers and a
prize-winning hog that belonged to Lucille's son, who was active in
the school's Future Farmers of America chapter, had its throat
slit.' 38
At school board meetings, Joann and Lucille were publicly vili-
fied for their views on religious liberty.139 From the time the litiga-
tion began, they received numerous anonymous threatening
telephone calls. They were also falsely listed on a "hot" check list
at a local grocery store. 40
When Joann went to the school to check on her children after
receiving news of a bomb threat there, she was attacked by a
school employee, who repeatedly bashed her head against a car
door and threatened to kill her.' 4' Joann was hospitalized with a
sprained shoulder. She also lost a lot of hair.' 42
The worst was yet to come, though. Shortly after the lawsuit was
filed, Joann's family's home was burned to the ground while she
was attending her son's football game.' 43 Having received phone
calls warning that her house would be torched, Joann is convinced
that this was a case of arson.'" While investigators said that the
fire was of a "suspicious nature," they also said they were unable to
134. Rob Gloster, Oklahoma Religion Suits Stir Bitter Feelings, UPI, Nov. 7, 1981,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
135. See id.
136. Id
137. Id.
138. Il.
139. Letter from Micheal Salem, attorney representing Bell and McCord, to Na-
dine Strossen, President, ACLU (Aug. 14, 1995) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law
Journal).
140. Id
141. See Gloster, supra note 134.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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find evidence as to who might have been responsible. 45 Joann be-
lieves the fire was set by someone who took literally a remark
made by Little Axe School Board member Elizabeth Butts.146
Asked to comment on the school employee's assault against Joann,
Butts had said, "People who play with fire get burned."'1 47
Joann's neighbors told her that they had seen a truck leaving the
area of her home shortly before the smoke became evident.'"
Joann believed that her' neighbors' description of this truck
matched that of a truck driven by someone who worked for a
school board member. Although both the Fire Marshall and the
FBI told her they thought it was a case of arson, no one was ever
prosecuted. 49
To its credit, the Little Axe Volunteer Fire Department did show
up at the fire. But, guess what? There was no water in their truck
tanks, so they did not fight the fire. Imagine every single thing you
own-every possession, every scrapbook, every piece of clothing,
every family photograph and heirloom. That is what burned to the
ground along with the Bells' home.' 50
Joann, her husband, and their four children moved from Little
Axe at the end of the school year.' 51 Joann's trial testimony under-
scored that, although she played a major role in successfully up-
holding constitutional guarantees of religious liberty, it was at an
enormous personal cost for herself and her family. Fighting back
tears, she testified: "I feel like we have been driven from the com-
munity .... People, I think, were ready to kill me if they could
have gotten away with it.' 52
The tragic experiences of the Bell and McCord families in
Oklahoma constitute extreme examples, but alas only slightly more
extreme than what many of our clients face when they dare to balk
at government-supported religion in public schools. Let me cite
another, more recent variation on the same theme, also involving a
brave woman who dares to stand up for the religious liberty of her-
self and her children against a public school's attempts to inculcate
religion. Like Joann Bell, she is a Christian, whose idea of Christi-
145. Id. See also Scott, supra note 131.
146. UPI, Dec. 8, 1982, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
147. I&
148. Letter from Micheal Salem to Nadine Strossen, supra note 139.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See UPI, supra note 146.
152. Id.
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anity is that it is a private matter, and not the business of the gov-
ernment or the government's schools. 153
When Lisa Herdahl moved to Ecru, Mississippi, with her hus-
band and six children in 1993, she was shocked to learn that her
children's public school sponsored regular religious activities, in-
cluding daily prayers, Bible readings broadcast over the public ad-
dress system, and a Bible studies class taught from a
fundamentalist perspective. 154 When her children refused to par-
ticipate in these school-organized religious activities, their class-
mates taunted and harassed them, calling them "atheists" and
"devil worshipers." When a teacher put earphones on one of Lisa's
sons to drown out the broadcast prayer and Bible readings, other
children started mocking him as "football head.' '1 55
Because school officials repeatedly refused Lisa's requests to re-
spect her children's rights, she turned to the ACLU to challenge
the school's practices. 56 In 1995, the judge granted our motion for
a preliminary injunction, enjoining the school district from trans-
mitting the morning prayers and Bible readings or permitting stu-
dent-led religious activities during school hours. 57 The judge
found that Lisa's children could likely feel stigmatized for exercis-
ing their First Amendment rights to opt out of the school-spon-
sored devotional exercises, which he held unconstitutional. 58 In
1996, the district court permanently enjoined and restrained the
defendants. 59
153. See John Burnett, Mississippi Parent Challenges School Prayer and Wins (Na-
tional Public Radio Morning Edition broadcast, Apr. 19, 1995) (noting that "[t]he
Hurdall's [sic] are practicing Lutherans who believe religion has no place in public
schools").
154. Stephanie Saul, A Lonely Battle in the Bible Belt; A Mother Fights to Halt
Prayers at Mississippi School, NEWSDAY, Mar. 13, 1995, at A8.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Herdahl v. Pontotoc County Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 902, 912 (N.D. Miss.
1995). See also Burnett, supra note 153; Mississippi Mom Calls Gingrich Idea "Com-
pletely Nuts," REUTERS, June 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File. In June, 1996, the judge issued an order permanently enjoining these school-
sponsored religious activities. 933 F. Supp. 582, 699-700 (N.D. Miss. 1996).
158. Herdahl, 887 F. Supp. at 911-12.
159. The permanent injunction reads as follows:
That each of the defendants and anyone acting in concert with any of them
are permanently ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from (1) transmitting
or authorizing the transmission of devotionals, including without limitation
the recitation of Bible verses and/or prayers, over the school intercom sys-
tem; (2) authorizing organized, vocal group prayers in classrooms during
classroom hours at North Pontotoc; (3) authorizing the teaching of classes
known as "Bible" or "A Biblical History of the Middle East," in their past or
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Successful as Lisa Herdahl's defense of religious liberty was, life
for her and her family became even harder after the lawsuit was
started. As one press account reported, "[t]he lawsuit mobilized
the community against Herdahl.' ' 16° Virtually every house and
business posted a sign opposing the Herdahls' fight for religious
freedom. Lisa says that she has been made an outcast in the com-
munity, with people whispering about her in grocery stores, and
threats of organizing a boycott against the convenience store she
managed. 161 She also received a death threat, and her convenience
store received a bomb threat.162 Lisa not only lost her job at the
convenience store, but she also cannot get another job, due to the
unpopularity of her defense of religious liberty; she has been de-
scribed as "unemployable in the entire state of Mississippi," be-
present form, in any grade; and (4) authorizing the showing of the video-
tapes "The King is Born," "He is Risen," and "America's Godly Heritage"
during American History classes; and
That the defendants shall specifically direct all elementary teachers and
other employees at North Pontotoc, and strictly enforce its directive, that
they may not facilitate, participate in, endorse, encourage, invite or sponsor
classroom prayer by students, including but not limited to designating, facili-
tating or assisting in designating, or enlisting individual students to lead vo-
cal group prayer, delaying or slowing departure of students for the
lunchroom to facilitate prayer, separating students who do and do not wish
to engage in such prayer, or engaging in the conduct concerning the "Bless-
ing for Lunch" contained in the instructions issued by defendant Flowers on
or about January 3, 1995 as set forth in Exhibit P3; and
That if the Mississippi State Board of Education does give final approval
to the new high school course "Biblical History of the Ancient Middle East,"
the defendants may offer that course in those grades (9-12), but the defend-
ants and anyone acting in concert with them are permanently ENJOINED
from teaching that or any other or successor course concerning the Bible or
religion in any manner that is not consistent with this court's decision and
the United States Constitution. This includes but is not limited to the fol-
lowing: (a) the course must be taught objectively as part of a secular pro-
gram of education; (b) the course may not be taught using the Bible as the
only source of historical fact or as if the Bible were actual literal history; (c)
students must be assigned reading from non-biblical sources of ancient Mid-
dle East history; (d) the course may not teach religious doctrine or sectarian
interpretation of the Bible; and (e) the District shall not accept an instructor
for the Bible course who has been approved for employment based in whole
or in part on a religious test, profession of faith or criteria involving particu-
lar beliefs about the Bible in the selection process.
933 F. Supp. 582, 599-600 (N.D. Miss. 1996).
160. Saul, supra note 154.
161. Id
162. Telephone Interview with David Ingebretsen, Executive Director, ACLU of
Mississippi (Aug. 23, 1995).
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cause of the state-wide publicity about her insistence that her
children's school respect their First Amendment rights.163
The ostracism and worse reactions that are often faced by those
who defend freedom of religion and conscience against govern-
mental inculcation were indicated by an ACLU staff member
whom U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun quoted in a
Court opinion.164 To illustrate the dangerous societal divisiveness
that results from government-sanctioned religious exercises, Justice
Blackmun quoted Michelle Parish, who was then the Executive Di-
rector of the ACLU of Utah:
[Of] all the issues the ACLU takes on-reproductive rights, dis-
crimination, jail and prison conditions, abuse of kids in the pub-
lic schools, police brutality, to name a few-by far the most
volatile issue is that of school prayer. Aside from our efforts to
abolish the death penalty, it is the only issue that elicits death
threats. 165
The harassment and threats to which Establishment Clause ad-
vocates are subject are underscored by an order that the ACLU
recently won from a federal judge in Idaho. In that case, challeng-
ing prayers that are organized and sponsored by a public school,
our clients were-as is common in such cases-proceeding under
pseudonyms. The school's lawyers had sought to have our clients'
identities revealed to them in a confidential proceeding in the
judge's chambers. However, our attorneys presented evidence and
arguments demonstrating the serious risks of harassment and vio-
lence directed against our clients, should their identities be re-
vealed. The judge was persuaded of these dangers and therefore
163. In June, 1997, the ACLU presented Lisa Herdahl with its 1997 Roger Baldwin
Medal of Liberty. Named in honor of the ACLU's principal organizer, this Medal is
the highest honor that the ACLU bestows. It is presented biennially to recognize
either distinguished lifetime contributions, or an exceptional particular contribution,
to civil liberties in the United States. Lisa was nominated for this award by a distin-
guished Screening Committee: Drew Days, Professor at Yale Law School and former
Solicitor General of the United States; Dr. Joycelyn Elders, Professor at the Univer-
sity of Arkansas Medical School and former Surgeon General of the United States;
Katha Pollitt, columnist and editor of the Nation Magazine; Oliver Thomas, Baptist
minister and First Amendment lawyer, Special Counsel to the National Council of
Churches and the Freedom Forum First Amendment Center; Arlinda Locker, a lead-
ing attorney specializing in Native American rights; and Diana Daniels, Vice Presi-
dent and General Counsel of The Washington Post.
164. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 607 n.10 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
165. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Michele A. Parish, Graduation Prayer
Violates the Bill of Rights, UTAH B.J. June-July 1991, at 19).
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denied the request to reveal our clients' identities even in the lim-
ited fashion sought by the school's lawyers. 166
D. Problems with Justice Scalia's Narrow Construction of the
Establishment Clause
During his lecture at JTS last month, Justice Scalia stressed his
extremely narrow view of the Establishment Clause, maintaining
that it does not prohibit the government from sponsoring religious
exercises, but that it only prohibits the government from sponsor-
ing specifically sectarian exercises. 167 This circumscribed interpre-
tation of the Establishment Clause is often denominated (no pun
intended) the "nonpreferentialist" view,' 6s since it posits that gov-
ernment may support religion in general, but just may not act in a
way that prefers any particular religion (or, concomitantly, that dis-
criminates against any particular religion).
Even applying Justice Scalia's own preferred approach to consti-
tutional interpretation, historic analysis, this nonpreferentialist the-
ory is not justified. In his dissenting opinion in Lee v. Weisman,
Justice Scalia set forth his nonpreferentialist interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, asserting that this interpretation was sup-
ported by the legislative history underlying the Clause.169 But Jus-
tice Souter's concurring opinion met and bested Justice Scalia on
his own ground of historical interpretation. Citing historical re-
search by University of Texas Law Professor Douglas Laycock,'170
Justice Souter reviewed the substantial evidence that the framers
did consider language that would have barred only government aid
to specific sects, but then deliberately rejected these narrower for-
mulations, in favor of the open-ended, broad prohibition in the Es-
tablishment Clause.' 7 1 As Justice Souter concluded:
166. Jane Doe v. Madison School Dist. No. 321, Civil Case # 90-0518-E-EJL (re-
versing prior ruling requiring identity revelation because he saw no compelling inter-
est for it). As this article went to press, the ACLU brought a lawsuit against school
officials in Pike County, Alabama on behalf of four Jewish students who were perse-
cuted for their religious beliefs and for their resistance to the school's persistent pro-
motion of Christianity. See Sue Anne Pressley, Tough Lessons in an Alabama Town;
Jewish Children Persecuted at School, Parents Charge in Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Sept. 2,
1997, at A3.
167. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. See Douglas Laycock, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution:
"Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 875 (1986).
169. Lee, 505 U.S. at 641.
170. Laycock, supra note 168, at 884-85.
171. Lee, 505 U.S. at 609-16 (Souter, J., concurring).
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What is remarkable is that, unlike the earliest House drafts or
the final Senate proposal, the prevailing language is not limited
to laws respecting an establishment of "a religion," "a national
religion," "one religious sect," or specific "articles of faith." The
Framers repeatedly considered and deliberately rejected such
narrow language and instead extended their prohibition to state
support for "religion" in general.
Implicit in their choice is the distinction between preferential
and nonpreferential establishments, which the weight of evi-
dence suggests the Framers appreciated .... Of particular note,
the Framers were vividly familiar with efforts in the colonies
and, later, the States to impose general, nondenominational as-
sessments and other incidents of ostensibly ecumenical estab-
lishments. . . . The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom,
written by Jefferson and sponsored by Madison, captured the
separationist response to such measures. Condemning all estab-
lishments, however nonpreferentialist, the Statute broadly guar-
anteed that "no man shall be compelled to frequent or support
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever," including
his own ....
What we thus know of the Framers' experience underscores
the observation of one prominent commentator, that confining
the Establishment Clause to a prohibition on preferential aid
"requires a premise that the Framers were extraordinarily bad
drafters-that they believed one thing but adopted language
that said something substantially different, and that they did so
after repeatedly attending to the choice of language." . . . We
must presume, since there is no conclusive evidence to the con-
trary, that the Framers embraced the significance of their textual
judgment. 72
Justice Souter's opinion in Lee v. Weisman also pointed to an-
other problem with the nonpreferentialist version of the Establish-
ment Clause, which was vividly demonstrated by Justice Scalia's
answer to a question after his lecture at the JTS last month. As
Justice Souter observed:
[N]onpreferentialism requires some distinction between "sectar-
ian" religious practices and those that would be, by some mea-
sure, ecumenical enough to pass Establishment Clause muster.
[B]y requiring the enquiry, nonpreferentialists invite the courts
to engage in comparative theology. I can hardly imagine a sub-
ject less amenable to the competence of the federal judiciary, or
more deliberately to be avoided where possible.'"
172. Id. at 614-16 (quoting Laycock, supra note 168, at 882-83).
173. Id. at 616-17.
462
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Indeed, after his JTS lecture, Justice Scalia raised some questions
about his competence to make such a determination. A woman in
the audience asked Justice Scalia why the rabbi's prayer in Lee v.
Weisman, which closely paraphrased a traditional Jewish prayer of
thanksgiving-the "Shehecheyanu"-did not violate even Justice
Scalia's limited view of the Establishment Clause. I wrote down
his exact answer. He said that, despite its traditional Jewish nature,
the prayer at issue in Weisman was nonetheless not sufficiently
"sectarian" to trigger his limited version of the Establishment
Clause because it was "not uncongenial to any other religion." I
fully share the questioner's flabbergasted response, which she ex-
pressed in these understated terms: "That's a very interesting view
of sectarianism." One has to wonder, if Justice Scalia does not
deem this government-sponsored prayer sufficiently sectarian to vi-
olate his nonpreferentialist conception of the Establishment
Clause, what government-sponsored prayer, if any, would satisfy
that limited conception.
IV. Free Exercise Clause
Last month, in introducing Justice Scalia, Rabbi Vizotsky an-
nounced the title and subject of Justice Scalia's lecture as concern-
ing "the religion clauses" of the First Amendment. However,
Justice Scalia's lecture focused on only one of those two clauses,
the Establishment Clause. He studiously omitted any sustained
discussion of its companion guarantee of religious liberty, the Free
Exercise Clause. Rather, he dismissively indicated that it should
not be given much weight or scope. This omission is completely
consistent with Justice Scalia's key role in decimating the Free Ex-
ercise Clause through his majority opinion in Employment Divi-
sion, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, in 1990.174 The
Smith decision has been described by experts as "the Dred Scott of
First Amendment law,' 175 making "a dead letter"'176 of the Free
Exercise Clause.
The scope of the damage that the Smith decision inflicted on reli-
gious freedom rights under the Free Exercise Clause is most di-
rectly expressed in the title of the statute that Congress
subsequently passed as a "legislative fix" for that damage, the
174. 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
175. See Oliver Thomas, Religious Freedom Finally has a Friend in the White House,
DALLAS MORNING NEws, Nov. 5, 1995, at 5J.
176. Oliver Thomas and David Saperstein, Religious Freedoms: Lost and in Need of
Restoration?, THE RECORDER, Aug. 13, 1993, at 8.
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"Religious Freedom Restoration Act."'1 77 Of course, no legislation
can ever completely "fix" a Supreme Court decision that cuts back
on constitutional protections, and no legislation can ever fully "re-
store" constitutional rights that have been judicially diminished.
Because legislation can always be repealed through ordinary legis-
lative processes, it does not afford the security and stability for
rights that the Constitution does. In contrast, at least in theory,
constitutional rights should be 'subject to limitation only through
the arduous super-majoritarian process of constitutional amend-
ment.178 Of course, as the Smith case itself illustrates, the Court
can in effect truncate constitutional rights through its
(mis)interpretation of them.
In June 1997, with Justice Scalia's support, the majority of the
Supreme Court compounded the damage that had been done to
free exercise rights in Smith, by holding that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act was itself unconstitutional.' 79  As Justice
O'Connor noted in her dissent, by abridging constitutional rights,
decisions such as Smith are particularly devastating, since "-as
this case so plainly illustrates-'correction through legislative ac-
tion is practically impossible."" 180 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor
again sharply criticized Smith-as she had done in her separate
opinion in the Smith case itself' 8 '-and urged the Court to re-ex-
amine it, explaining: "[I]n light of both our precedent and our Na-
tion's tradition of religious liberty, Smith is demonstrably
wrong."' 2 Justices Souter and Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's
call for a re-examination of Smith.183 For example, Justice Souter
expressed "serious doubts about the precedential value of the
Smith rule and its entitlement to adherence."' 8
In his Smith opinion, Jusfice Scalia ruled that as long as the gov-
ernment does not overtly or intentionally discriminate against ad-
herents of particular religious beliefs when it enacts a generally
applicable law, the Free Exercise Clause does not insulate such ad-
herents from complying with the law, even at the cost of violating
177. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1993).
178. U.S. CONsT. art. V.
179. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (holding that Congress had
exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
180. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2177 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct.
1114 (1996) (slip op., at 18)).
181. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891.
182. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2177.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2186.
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sincere religious beliefs. 185 In so ruling, the Court abandoned the
accepted understanding of the Free Exercise Clause as providing
some absolute protection against government measures that sub-
stantially burden sincere religious belief.18 Justice Scalia's view of
the religious liberty guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause is as
narrow as his view of the religious liberty guaranteed by the Estab-
lishment Clause. According to his Smith opinion, the Free Exer-
cise Clause amounts merely to a shadow of the Equal Protection
Clause, guaranteeing only formally equal treatment of all religious
beliefs; so long as a governmental rule on its face applies equally to
all religious beliefs and was not intentionally designed to have an
adverse impact on any particular faith, then it is Constitutionally
irrelevant that the rule in fact has such an adverse impact. The
religious believers whose free exercise rights are in fact-albeit in-
advertently-burdened unequally by a facially neutral rule are de-
prived of any constitutional recourse.
This sterile view of the Free Exercise Clause severely cripples its
ability to protect members of minority religious groups. In her
concurring opinion, which excoriated the abrogation of longstand-
ing Free Exercise Clause standards in Justice Scalia's majority
opinion, Justice O'Connor noted:
[F]ew States would be so naive as to enact a law directly prohib-
iting or burdening a religious practice as such .... If the First
Amendment is to have any vitality, it ought not be construed to
cover only the extreme and hypothetical situation in which a
State directly targets a religious practice.187
185. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-80. This paragraph, as well as the remainder of this
section, is based upon Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A
Roadblock to Meaningful Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 285, 382-88 (1991).
186. This previously accepted interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is exempli-
fied in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in which the Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause required the state to exempt from its compulsory education require-
ment Amish children whose parents' sincere religious beliefs would have been vio-
lated by maintaining their children in school beyond age 13. The Court in Yoder
noted:
[T]here are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even
under regulations of general applicability .... A regulation neutral on its
face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional require-
ment for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of
religion.
Id. at 219-20.
187. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Justice
O'Connor further observed: "There is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of gen-
eral applicability or general criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral toward religion can
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Justice O'Connor concluded that the majority's new rule "'rele-
gates a serious First Amendment value to the barest level of mini-
mum scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already
provides."1 88
To understand how truncated Justice Scalia's view of the Free
Exercise Clause is, one should consider the Supreme Court's tradi-
tional interpretation and enforcement of that clause. 189 In stark
contrast with Justice Scalia's view that the clause prohibits only
laws that facially, intentionally discriminate against particular reli-
gious beliefs, the Court traditionally viewed it as guaranteeing
some absolute degree of freedom from government burdens on
religious exercises, regardless of how equally or widely dispersed
those burdens might be, and regardless of whether the government
imposed them inadvertently rather than intentionally.190 Prior to
Smith, the Supreme Court consistently held that the Free Exercise
Clause requires the government to exempt an individual from a
general legal obligation if it substantially burdened the individual's
free exercise of religious beliefs, unless a nonexemption policy
would survive strict judicial scrutiny-i.e., the government could
show that, due to the exemptions, it could not substantially achieve
a goal of compelling importance.' 9'
coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties
just as effectively as laws aimed at religion." Id. at 901.
188. Id. at 894 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136,
141-42 (1987) (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. at 727 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part))).
189. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 570-71 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring) (stating that "whatever Smith's virtues, they do not include a
comfortable fit with settled law").
190. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (cita-
tions omitted) (stating that "[t]he First Amendment... does not distinguish between
laws that are generally applicable and laws that target particular religious practices...
Our free exercise cases have all concerned generally applicable laws that had the ef-
fect of significantly burdening a religious practice."); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-20;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940).
191. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (reaffirming
that "[tihe free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial
burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a
compelling government interest justifies the burden"); Hobbie v. Unemployment Ap-
peals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (noting that laws burdening religion "must be
subjected to strict scrutiny and could be justified only by proof by the State of a com-
pelling interest"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (stating that "[t]he
state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to
accomplish an overriding governmental interest"); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707, 718 (1981) (stating that "[t]he state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by
showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state inter-
est"); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (stating that "only those interests of the highest order
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A leading case in establishing this understanding of free exercise
rights was Sherbert v. Verner.192 In Sherbert, the Court held that a
state was required to exempt a Sabbath observer from the general
obligation of being available for Saturday work as a precondition
for receiving unemployment compensation. 93 The Court made
clear that the Free Exercise Clause was not satisfied by the mere
fact that the state had treated all individuals equally with respect to
their free exercise rights, insofar as all individuals were subject to
the Saturday work requirement. 94 Nor did the Court deem the
Free Exercise Clause to be satisfied by the mere fact that the state
had not intentionally discriminated against Sabbatarians in crafting
its rules governing unemployment compensation. It was undis-
puted that the state simply had not considered the differential ad-
verse impact that the facially nondiscriminatory requirement would
have on adherents of certain religious beliefs. 95
In Sherbert, the Court underscored that the Free Exercise Clause
assured an absolute right to freedom from any substantial burden
on the exercise of one's beliefs, no matter how equally or inadver-
tently that burden might have been imposed. That right could be
limited only if the government could satisfy the heavy burden of
proving that exempting the religiously burdened individual from
the general obligation would prevent it from substantially achiev-
ing an objective of compelling importance. 96
After Sherbert, the Court consistently enforced these Free Exer-
cise Clause principles in a line of cases that culminated in 1989 with
Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 97 In Smith, the
Court departed from this long line of precedent and issued a gen-
eral holding that strict scrutiny is an inappropriately rigorous stan-
dard for reviewing government measures that substantially burden
religious freedom. 98
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (noting that a generally
applicable regulation can be applied to a religious objector only if "some compelling
state interest... justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment
rights").
192. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
193. Id. at 403-04.
194. Id. at 404-06.
195. Id. at 406-09.
196. Id. at 408-09.
197. 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
198. In three pre-Smith cases, the Court rejected Establishment Clause claims, over
strong dissents, citing particular reasons why it should not apply the strict scrutiny of
Smith and its progeny to those specific cases. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (rejecting challenge to federal govern-
19971
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The Court's abandonment of meaningful judicial scrutiny was
particularly startling in Smith because the government had never
challenged the strict standard that, consistent with longstanding
Supreme Court precedent, the courts below had applied. There-
fore, this subject was not addressed in the parties' briefs or in oral
argument. The briefs and argument were confined to the sole issue
on which the Supreme Court granted review: whether a state's fail-
ure to exempt the sacramental use of peyote by members of the
Native American Church from the state's general drug laws sur-
vived strict judicial scrutiny. 199
Never, throughout the protracted history of the litigation in
Smith-which had been before the Supreme Court on a previous
occasion 200-had any court or party argued that the challenged
state action, which clearly imposed a substantial burden on the reli-
gious exercise of Native American Church members, should be re-
viewed under a less exacting standard than strict scrutiny. Yet,
without the benefit of briefs or oral arguments, the majority, sua
sponte, refused to assess the state's nonexemption under a strict
scrutiny standard and even refused to review that nonexemption
under any standard at all. The Court merely announced a new per
se rule that "an individual's religious beliefs [do not] excuse him
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct
ment's logging and road construction activities on lands sacred to several Native
American tribes, even though it was undisputed that these activities "could have dev-
astating effects on traditional Indian religious practices"); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693
(1986) (rejecting challenge to federal benefits statute requiring benefit applicants and
recipients to supply their Social Security numbers, despite claim by Native American
parents that it would violate their religious beliefs to obtain and provide a Social
Security number for their daughter); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)
(rejecting challenge to Air Force regulations that forbade the wearing of a yarmulke
by an ordained Orthodox Jewish rabbi who was a commissioned Air Force officer
working as a clinical psychologist on an Air Force base, despite his sincere belief that
he had a religious obligation to wear it).
In both Roy and Lyng, the Court expressly distinguished Sherbert on the ground
that the First Amendment does not "require the Government itself to behave in ways
that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual development .... The Free
Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct
its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular
citizens." Roy, 476 U.S. at 699 (emphasis in original); accord Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449-50.
In Goldman, the Court emphasized the tradition of judicial deference to military reg-
ulations. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507 (stating that "[o]ur review of military regula-
tions challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than
constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society").
199. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990) (No. 88-1213).
200. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (describing procedural history). The Supreme
Court's previous decision in Smith is reported at 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
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that the State is free to regulate," '' notwithstanding the Free Ex-
ercise Clause.20 2
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Smith candidly acknowledges
that its reasoning would eliminate the Free Exercise Clause's role
as the guarantor of religious liberty for adherents of minority reli-
gions, relegating their freedom to the good will of legislative major-
ities.2 °3 Moreover, Justice Scalia acknowledges that legislative
majorities may well be unsympathetic to the religious liberty con-
cerns of members of minority religions. As he said, "leaving ac-
commodation to the political process will place at a relative
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged
in.' ' 204 That this observation is an understatement is indicated by
the fact that Smith itself, as well as two other recent cases in which
the Court has rejected Free Exercise Clause claims-Bowen v.
Roy20 5 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Associa-
tion2 06 -all involved formally neutral government measures that
severely undermined the free exercise rights of Native Americans.
Justice Scalia's conclusory response was that discriminatory trunca-
tion of the constitutional rights of minority groups is the "unavoid-
201. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79; see Boerne, 117 S. Ct., at 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Court had never had "briefing and argument on the merits of [the
Smith] rule... in any case, including Smith itself").
202. The Court's sweeping revision of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence was the
basis for a petition for rehearing that was jointly filed by a broad array of constitu-
tional scholars, religious organizations, and other individuals and groups. That peti-
tion, which the Court denied, read in part as follows:
Because the Court's far-reaching holding resolved an issue not briefed by
the parties, because recent research on the history of the Free Exercise
Clause demonstrates that the broader reading of the Clause rejected by the
Court... was contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment, and
because assertions that the Court has "never held" that the Free Exercise
Clause requires government to justify unintended burdens on free exercise
must come as a surprise to the federal and state courts, state attorneys gen-
eral, and treatise writers who have uniformly read this Court's Free Exercise
decisions from as far back as at least Sherbert v. Verner, as holding precisely
that, a rehearing is appropriate.
Petition for Rehearing, Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990), reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (June 4, 1990).
203. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
204. Id.
205. 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting free exercise challenge to federal benefits stat-
ute requiring benefit applicants and recipients to supply their Social Security num-
bers, despite claim by Native American parents that it would violate their religious
beliefs to obtain and provide a Social Security number for their daughter).
206. 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988) (Douglas J., concurring) (rejecting free exercise
challenge to federal government's logging and road construction activities on lands
sacred to several Native American tribes, even though it was undisputed that these
activities "could have devastating effects on traditional Indian, religious practices").
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able consequence of democratic government." ' 7 This cavalier
conclusion, though, shirks the Court's historic responsibility to
avoid such consequences. As Justice O'Connor retorted, "[T]he
First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of
those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and
may be viewed with hostility. '20 8
Completely contrary to Justice Scalia's view about the power of
majorities to deprive minorities of their fundamental rights, the
very purpose of the Bill of Rights, and of the Supreme Court in
enforcing it, is to protect the rights of minority groups and individ-
uals from what James Madison called "the tyranny of the major-
ity.'"209 It is worth recalling the eloquent words of Justice Jackson
in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, as quoted
above.210
In Smith, this powerful statement of central constitutional princi-
ple is relegated to Justice O'Connor's concurrence,21' rather than
being cited by Justice Scalia's majority opinion. Even more dis-
turbing, Justice Scalia's opinion twice relies212 on Minersville
School District v. Gobitis,21 3 the long-since discredited decision that
rejected the religious freedom claims of Jehovah's Witness school-
children whose faith prevented them from honoring mandatory
flag salute laws. Even the Court that decided Gobitis considered it
so clearly erroneous that it overruled the decision, with only one
dissent, just three years later in Barnette. It is an ominous sign that,
in citing Gobitis, Justice Scalia's opinion does not even note the
fact that this decision was subsequently overruled, much less abide
by the fundamental principles enunciated in the landmark decision
overruling Gobitis.
As Justice O'Connor's opinion recognized, minority religions are
always the hardest hit by any cutback on religious freedom.214 Ac-
cordingly, in the wake of the Smith decision, before the enactment
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to repair some of its
damage, federal judges were unable to enforce the Free Exercise
207. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (1990).
208. Id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
209. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
210. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
211. Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212. Id at 879.
213. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
214. Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
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Clause to protect the religious liberty of members of minority
faiths.215
In one of the most poignant opinions of this sort, Judge Ray-
mond Pettine of the Federal District Court in Rhode Island had
previously upheld the free exercise rights of a Hmong family whose
religious beliefs were violated by a state law mandating autopsies
for accident victims; according to their beliefs, when a body is
autopsied, the soul cannot go to Heaven. Therefore, this family
was tormented by the belief that the soul of their son, who had
been killed in an automobile accident, and who had subsequently
been autopsied, would be condemned to wander the Earth. Rely-
ing on the Supreme Court's longstanding Free Exercise Clause
doctrine, Judge Pettine had granted their claim. However, in the
interim between his ruling on the merits of their claim and the
hearing on the issue of damages, the Supreme Court issued its
Smith decision, repealing established Free Exercise Clause prece-
dents and principles. Accordingly, Judge Pettine was forced to re-
verse his previous ruling. His rueful comment in doing so
215. See, e.g., Cornerstone Bible Church v. Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991)
(holding that application of city's zoning laws to prevent a church from conducting
services in an area zoned for commercial uses raised no free exercise concerns, even
though the city permitted secular not-for-profit organizations in that area); Rector of
St. Bartholomew's Church v. New York, 914 F.2d 348, 355 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991) (rejecting free exercise claim where city's application of
facially neutral landmark designation law "drastically restricted the Church's ability
to raise revenue to carry out its various charitable and ministerial programs"); Mont-
gomery v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1990), affd, 940 F.2d 661
(6th Cir. 1991) (compelling autopsy despite contrary, deeply felt conservative Jewish
beliefs); United States v. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc'y of Friends,
753 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (compelling the Society of Friends, commonly
known as "the Quakers," to enforce an IRS levy against two employee-members who
conscientiously refused to pay the military portion of their federal taxes despite the
Friends' assertion that the IRS could not compel the Society to violate the religious
beliefs of members by acting as an enforcement arm of the government); Yang v.
Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990) (denying damages to grieving parents who
were adherents of the Hmong faith after an autopsy was performed on their son
against the dictates of their religion); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n,
874 P.2d 274, 278-80 (Alaska), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994) (holding that land-
lord's refusal to rent to an unmarried couple violated state fair housing law and could
not be excused on the ground that landlord sincerely believed that renting would
facilitate fornication, and would therefore be sinful); Smith v. Fair Employment &
Housing Comm'n, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 709, 719 (Cal. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
2531 (1997) (holding that religious landlord could not discriminate against unmarried
couples regardless of the religious beliefs of the landlord); State v. Hershberger, 462
N.W. 2d 393 (Minn. 1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause provided no basis
for exempting an Amish farmer from displaying a bright orange triangle on his buggy,
to which the farmer objected on religious grounds, even though the evidence showed
that another material would have served the State's purpose equally well).
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underscores Justice Scalia's gutting of the Free Exercise Clause, as
a potential protector of minority religious beliefs: "While I feel
constrained to apply the majority's opinion to the instant case, I
cannot do this without expressing my profound regret and my own
agreement with Justice Blackmun's forceful dissent. 216
As members of a minority religion, Jews also suffered inroads on
their religious liberty in the period after the Court rendered Smith
and before Congress enacted, and the President signed, the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act. In one case, parallel to the
Hmong case just described, a Jewish accident victim was subject to
an unnecessary autopsy in violation of his mother's religious be-
liefs.217 In other situations, Orthodox Jewish prisoners were
forced to choose between eating pork or no meat at all.218
It is doubly ironic that Justice Scalia has played such a significant
role in decimating the Court's and Constitution's support for reli-
gious freedom, because that constitutional revisionism flies in the
face of two concerns that Justice Scalia has stressed in other
contexts.
First, eliminating the Free Exercise Clause as a meaningful
source of support for religious liberty is inconsistent with Justice
Scalia's stated concerns about the religious liberty of Christians in
the U.S., which he considers to be embattled.219 Second, Justice
Scalia's radical rewriting of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence in
Smith was undertaken without any consideration of the history and
tradition which he has otherwise stressed 220-including in his lec-
ture at JTS221-should be the underpinning of all constitutional
decisionmaking. As Justice O'Connor explained in her dissenting
opinion in the Court's 1997 decision that invalidated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act and reaffirmed Smith-City of Boerne v.
Flores-the historical evidence supports the Court's pre-Smith ap-
216. Yang, 750 F. Supp. at 559.
217. See Thomas Zambito, 'A Violation, A Desecration '-Mother Sues Coroner
Over Son's Autopsy, BERGEN RECORD, Oct. 3, 1995, at 3.
218. See Laura LaFay, Inmates Must Prove Beliefs for Meals; Requests for Jewish,
Nation of Islam Meals Have Risen Greatly in Prisons, VIRGINIA PILOT, Mar. 31, 1996,
at BI (noting that in Virginia, kosher and Nation of Islam meals are served at only
one prison, the Buckingham correctional facility in Dillwyn).
219. See supra Part IIC.
220. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Lewis v. Casey, 116 S.
Ct. 2174, 2196 (1996); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 849, 855 (1989).
221. Bridges: A Liberal/Conservative Dialogue with Larry Josephson (NPR radio
broadcast, Aug. 2, 1996) (transcript on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
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proach to the Free Exercise Clause, and therefore affords further
support for overturning Smith:
I shall not restate what has been said in other opinions, which
have demonstrated that Smith is gravely at odds with our earlier
free exercise precedents .... Rather, I examine here the early
American tradition of religious free exercise to gain insight into
the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause-an in-
quiry the Court in Smith did not undertake....
The historical evidence casts doubt on the Court's current in-
terpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. The record instead
reveals that its drafters and ratifiers more likely viewed the Free
Exercise Clause as a guarantee that government may not unnec-
essarily hinder believers from freely practicing their religion, a
position consistent with our pre-Smith jurisprudence.222
Likewise, Justice Souter's dissent in the same case stressed that
his previously explained "serious doubts about the precedential
value of the Smith rule""22 had been "intensified... by the histori-
cal arguments going to the original understanding of the Free Exer-
cise Clause presented in Justice O'Connor's opinion, . . . which
raises very substantial issues about the soundness of the Smith
rule."224
To be sure, in the Boerne case, Justice Scalia wrote a separate
concurring opinion (in which Justice Stevens joined), "to respond
briefly to the claim of Justice O'Connor's dissent that historical
materials support a result contrary to the one reached in" Smith.225
As Justice Scalia's own language indicates, though, his discussion in
Boerne is only a "brief" one. Therefore, the fact remains-as
stressed in Justice Souter's dissent in Boerne-that the Court still
has never had briefing or oral argument on any aspect of the Smith
rule, including its (non)fidelity to the original understanding of the
Free Exercise Clause; accordingly, it also remains the case that the
Court has never comprehensively addressed those issues.226
V. Conclusion
I would like to close now by quoting from the Foreword to the
Anti-Defamation League's book about the extreme Right, which I
222. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2178 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting), (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 564-77 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2172 (Scalia, J., concurring)
226. Id. at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting)
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mentioned earlier. This Foreword, written by ADL's National Di-
rector, Abraham H. Foxman, is an eloquent reminder that strictly
enforcing both First Amendment religion clauses is as essential for
preserving religious liberty as it is for preserving a tolerant, plural-
istic, democratic society. He wrote:
Religious righters seem unable to understand-and the plu-
ralists among us need to continue to make the case-that in
America tolerance and pluralism are traditional values, however
imperfectly realized, and that they are precisely the values that
bolster religion ....
Thanks to the Constitution's First Amendment, the sanctity of
personal faith and the determination to achieve a better world-
a determination that often arises from faith-have been pro-
tected throughout American history. That protection is one of
the glories of the nation's heritage-a great traditional value.
How ironic and unfortunate that it is now assaulted in the name
of religion and traditional morality. The Anti-Defamation
League, with this report, aims to help ensure that in the face of
such an assault, all those who choose may honor, by the lights of
their own faith.., the prophet Micah's declaration: "And what
does the Lord require of you? To act justly and to love mercy
and to walk humbly with your God." '227
227. Abraham H. Foxman, foreword to CANTOR, supra note 17, at iv (quoting
Micah 6:8 (New King James)).
